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This Essay addresses the ethic of community in criminal prosecution.!
Long echoed in the rhetoric of criminal justice, the ethic continues to gain
greater resonance through the expanding advocacy practice of community
prosecution. Engrafted from the community-policing and community-court
movements of the last decade, and invigorated by interdisciplinary research
high-lighting the influence of community norms on civic character and so-
ciety, the ethic emphasizes the values of citizen participation, institutional
decentralization, and local accountability in the prosecution function.
These valijes are intended to foster citizen-state collaboration and grass-
roots equality initiatives within the criminal-justice system. Aspiring to
prevent individual crime and enhance collective welfare, the practice
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envisions more responsive, community-oriented prosecutorial roles and
strategies.
Academics praise community-prosecution programs for their
"exciting new working partnerships with communities in preventing and
addressing crime and in defining justice." Some, like Anthony Thompson,
temper their praise by pointing out that such programs operate without a
"comprehensive analysis" or "coherent vision" of the prosecutorial role in
community-based contexts.' Thompson complains of haphazard design and
implementation, inadequate study, and insufficient programmatic reflec-
tion.4 Although sympathetic, his complaints test the goals, values, and
methods of the community-prosecution movement.
No less sympathetic, this Essay tests the community-prosecution
movement on a more abstract plane. It surveys the theoretical foundation of
the movement, tracing the role and rationale of prosecutors in community-
based advocacy, specifically in communities of color.' Its main thesis is
that the enlargement of citizen participation, institutional decentralization,
and accountability of federal and state prosecution offices to local commu-
nities stimulates citizen-state collaboration and grassroots equality initia-
tives broadly within the criminal-justice system, thereby ameliorating the
conditions of poverty, disempowerment, segregation, and crime pervading
communities of color.
Prosecutors in communities of color make daily decisions about racial
identity, racialized narrative, and race-conscious representation. These de-
cisions shape the identities of both defendants and victims. Similar deci-
sions inform the work of defense lawyers, judges, and law-enforcement
agents. Together they produce race-coded strategies of advocacy and adju-
dication. Paradoxically, within the sphere of criminal justice and legal eth-
ics, race shadows the actions of prosecutors and defenders yet often fails to
rouse debate. Part of this silence stems from legal positivism and the prac-
ticed separation of law and morality. Part rises from the complexities of
racial identity and narrative coupled with their inexorable slippage and his-
torical density. Part also branches out from the practical necessities of legal
representation and the strategic efficacy of "race-ing"6 legal discourse for
juries, judges, and the juridical public.
2. See Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
321,324 (2002) (footnote omitted).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 325.
5. By communities of color, I mean communities where people of color (e.g., Black, Latino/a,
Asian, Native American) comprise a majority of the population. For a resource that maps the
experiences of diverse communities of color, see RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A
DIVERSE AMERICA 91-428 (Juan F. Perea et al. eds., 2000).
6. "Race-ing" describes the coloring of identity in law, culture, and society. It occurs through
speech and conduct, finding expression in symbol, performance, and text. See Charles R. Lawrence, If
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Situated at the intersection of poverty, segregation, and crime, the
community-prosecution movement offers the opportunity to challenge
prosecutorial silence in matters of race. Meeting that challenge requires
tolerance for ambiguity in the treatment of identity and narrative in legal
agency, as well as skepticism about the use of pragmatism and necessi-
tarian logic in advocacy. Most importantly, it requires scholars to cast aside
traditional accounts of racial identity and racialized narrative, an act of re-
bellion that upsets dominant visions of the racialized subject and race-
neutral representation.
In the academic and practice literature of the prosecution-and-defense
process, defendant-specific accounts of the racial subject in criminal law
frequently invoke the stereotyped image of the Black lawbreaker.7 Like-
wise, defendant-based racialized narratives often describe a natural
White/Black hierarchy, as in the subordinating story of Black rage.8 Yet
accounts of representation typically portray a race-neutral process of advo-
cacy uninfected by prosecutorial, judicial, or juror bias.9
To be sure, neither theorists nor practitioners of the criminal-justice
system fully embrace a racialized account of identity and narrative, nor do
they accept the system's colorblind vision of advocacy. For many, identity
is contingent."0 Its features depend on the private and public location of the
legal subject, for example in the domestic context of the family or in the
market context of the workplace. For such commentators, narrative is
rooted in voice and story. Its dissonance echoes the private and public ten-
sions of subjectivity impelled by multiple roles and relationships. For these
commentators, advocacy is embedded in competing visions of law, race,
and society. Held within historically situated prosecution and defense prac-
tices, that competition produces the entrenched dichotomies of racial mean-
ing. In fact, the prosecution and defense of criminal cases work in tandem
He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 443 n.52
(discussing the genealogy of the term "race-ing").
7. On the identity construction of Black lawbreakers in White-majority and Black-minority
communities, see Regina Austin, "The Black Community, " Its Laivbreakers, and a Politics of
Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1769, 1776-87 (1992).
8. For a useful history of the Black-rage defense, see PAUL HARRIS, BLACK RAGE CONFRONTS
THE LAW 1-80 (1997).
9. For a discussion of racial bias in prosecutorial, juror, and judicial decision making, see Nancy
J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury
Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REv. 63 (1993); Elizabeth L. Earle, Note, Banishing the Thirteenth Juror: An
Approach to the Identification of Prosecutorial Racism, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1212 (1992); Bryan A.
Stevenson & Ruth E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judicial Tolerance of Racial Bias in Criminal
Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 509 (1994).
10. On the contingency of identity in the social construction of race, gender, and sexuality, see
Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. Rv. 581, 605-16 (1990);
Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex,"
"Gender, " and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. Rav. 1, 3 6-204
(1995).
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to create a public site for the meaning-making function of race-tailored so-
ciolegal imagery and discourse. At the same time, they offer a public vista
for re-envisioning the sociolegal relations and institutions of race.
Nowhere in the criminal-justice system is social meaning more de-
bated and race more controverted than in the trials of racial violence." In
the race trials of White-on-Black and Black-on-White violence, racial iden-
tity is contested, racialized narrative is disputed, and advocacy is driven by
a clash of color-coded tactics.' 2 Such trials embroil prosecutors and de-
fenders in a public struggle over not only epistemology and cognition, but
also interpretation and discourse. Put simply, race trials challenge lawyers',
judges', and jurors' habits of mind. Those habits affect our ways of know-
ing guilt, seeing wrongdoing, and fathoming harm. They also influence our
ways of speaking about blame and seeking punishment. Fundamentally,
race trials challenge the professional ideology and role of lawyers. More
deeply, the trials confront the principles of partisanship and moral nonac-
countability that inform the standard conception of the American adversary
system. I I
The racialized adversarial ideology of prosecutors and defenders
comes at a cost to defendants, victims, and communities of color, though it
11. For example, consider the recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
overturning a jury verdict against Lemrick Nelson and Charles Price for civil-rights violations in the
allegedly race-incited 1991 killing of Yankel Rosenbaum in New York. The federal jury verdict and
prior state prosecution followed four days of interracial street violence between Blacks and Hasidic
Jews spurred by the motorcade-crash death of a seven-year-old Black child and the stabbing death of
Rosenbaum in the Crown Heights section of Brooklyn. The state trial, on charges of second-degree
murder and manslaughter, ended in acquittal. The federal trial, on charges that Nelson and Price
interfered with Rosenbaum's federally protected public activities under a Reconstruction-era public-
accommodations statute, resulted in convictions and prison sentences. United States v. Nelson, 277
F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Jane Fritsch, New Trial for 2 in Killing of Hasid in 1991 Unrest in
Crown Heights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,2002, at A19.
12. Consider again the clash of color-coded tactics in United States v. Nelson, supra note 11. In
Nelson, federal prosecutors and defense lawyers sparred over the government's motion to stand the
accused teenager, Lemrick Nelson, on trial as an adult on the disputed ground of his irredeemable and
immutable deviance and, moreover, over the defense motion for judicial recusal on the explicit ground
of Judge Trager's racial and religious bias. Trager is White and Jewish. Id.
Both teams also grappled over Trager's denial of the defendants' objection to the prosecutors' use
of five out of nine (55%) of the government's peremptory challenges to strike African American
candidates from the jury pool, and his denial of their for-cause challenge to a Jewish juror ("Juror 108")
who had expressed grave doubts about his ability to be objective. Id.
Prosecution and defense teams additionally battled over Trager's controversial jury-selection
decisions to bypass an alternate White juror, remove a second White juror from the panel, and select-
out of order-an African American juror and Juror 108 from a list of alternates to fill two open places
on the jury. Despite their prior objections, the defense teams, and Nelson and Price as well, consented
to the court-initiated plan for empanelling Juror 108 on the main jury. The prosecution team not only
approved the scheme, but also argued on appeal that the defendants' express consent constituted a
waiver, extinguishing their Sixth Amendment and due-process rights. Id See also Anthony V. Alfieri,
Ethics, Race, and Reform, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1389 (2002).
13. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JusTIcE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 50-55, 154-57 (1988);
Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1339-63 (1998).
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is presumed to be crucial to the guarantee of criminal justice. The cost
weighs upon their individual dignity and their collective civic standing. A
detailed accounting of the dignitary cost of race-tainted adversarial justice
to defendants, victims, and communities of color is beyond the scope of
this Essay. So too is a collective assessment of the civic harm (cultural,
economic, and political) inflicted upon communities of color. Although
crucial to the larger enterprise at stake, these more thoroughgoing apprais-
als must wait. Thus cabined in its aspirations, this Essay seeks to renew the
normative commitment to community implicit in criminal prosecution and
to reconfigure its meaning more closely with the civic and dignitary inter-
ests of a multicultural society.
Community-prosecution programs advance the civic and dignitary
interests of victims, offenders, and communities of color by affording op-
portunities for citizen-state collaboration and by encouraging grassroots
justice initiatives. Both public-private collaboration and grassroots mobili-
zation enhance autonomy-based dignity and increase civic standing in poli-
tics and society. 4 The process of fostering street-level collaboration
between citizens and the state, and moreover, promoting anticrime and
criminal-justice campaigns in citizen-state coalitions, lays the groundwork
for broader political empowerment." By any measure, empowerment com-
bines the spirit of normative and civic renewal. 6
The Essay is divided into five parts. Part I outlines the history and
structure of community-prosecution programs. Part II links the normative
underpinnings of these programs to the jurisprudence of liberalism, femi-
nism, and critical race theory. Part III assesses the normative import of
14. Both cultural status and economic station may lag behind heightened civic standing. See
DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTrOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 108-26 (1992);
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 42-50 (1989).
15. Community organizers in impoverished and crime-ridden communities routinely combine
antipoverty and anticrime initiatives in their organizing strategies. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Practicing
Community, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1747, 1747-49 (1994).
16. Recent accounts of criminal law and the criminal-justice system display the same spirit of
renewal. Spurred by a shared search for community in criminal law, the accounts signal a growing
interest in normativity within the study of law and society. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the
Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 610-22 (1998); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M.
Kahan, Lat and (Norms o) Order in the Inner-City, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 805,809-30 (1998).
Distinct from a purely behavioral analysis of law, normative inquiry interrogates the private and
public meaning of procedural rules, substantive laws, and social relationships for individuals, their
affiliated groups, and their entwined communities. On the resurgence of social-norm theory in law, see
Elizabeth Anderson, Beyond Homo Economicus: New Developments in Theories of Social Norms, 29
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 170 (2000); Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on
the New Behavioral Lmv and Economics Movement, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 973 (2000).
Crafted to discern the meaning of community prosecution in the context of race-contaminated
poverty, crime, and violence, this Essay extends the social meaning turn emerging in contemporary
criminal-law scholarship and policy research. For historical background on the evolution and content of
normative theory and social-meaning research, see Bernard E. Harcourt, After the "Social Meaning
Turn": Implications for Research Design and Methods of Proof in Contemporary Criminal Lav Policy
Analysis, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 179 (2000).
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antecedent community-policing programs and community drug courts. Part
IV evaluates objections to community-based models of criminal prosecu-
tion from the standpoints of ethics, institutional function, and political le-
gitimacy. Finally, Part V considers the application of community norms
and practices in the prosecution of racial violence. The Essay concludes
with an effort to distill and transform the sociolegal meaning of race,




A. Locating Community in Prosecution
The evolving structure of community-prosecution programs derives
from sociolegal norms and practices bound up in criminal law and post-war
civil- and criminal-justice reform movements. 7 The norms of criminal law
are founded on culpability and desert. The path from lawbreaking to culpa-
bility and from desert to punishment traverses the formal and informal
processes of the state, its agents, and its institutions. The starting point of
this pathway is community. Under the colorblind conventions of criminal
law, lawbreaking is a breach of the community covenants of obligation and
obedience, not an act of racial defiance or fidelity. Culpability is a collec-
tive determination of communal breach, not a race-infected cultural infer-
ence. Desert is a collective assessment of consequence and worth, not a
moment of racial subordination. Punishment, in the physicality of impris-
onment and the sentence of death, is a collective expression of retribution,
not an artifact of racial animus.
Criminal-law norms and practices evoke community and race through
force and rhetoric. The multifaceted rhetoric of crime and criminal justice
discloses both reconstructive and destructive sentiments. Reconstructive
instincts employ the rhetoric of atonement and forgiveness, as well as the
rhetoric of rehabilitation and social reintegration. 8 They call for mercy and
reconciliation. Destructive impulses go beyond deterrence and prevention
17. See Victoria Nourse, The New Normativity: The Abuse Excuse and the Resurgence of
Judgment in the Criminal Lmv, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1435 (1998) (book review) (comparing liberal and
republican criminal-law conceptions of punishment and excuse).
18. On the rhetoric of atonement, forgiveness, and rehabilitation, see Richard C. Boldt,
Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1218-45
(1998); Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1804-29 (1999); David
M. Lerman, Forgiveness in the Criminal Justice System: If It Belongs, Then Why Is It So Hard to
Find?, 27 FORDHANI URB. L.J. 1663, 1663-67 (2000).
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to trumpet the rhetoric of vengeance and retributive punishment. 9 They
call for pain and banishment.
The rhetorical tropes of crime and criminal justice are part of the ordi-
nary discourse of law and culture." Rhetoric shapes the domains of culture
in the arts and in the media, and the perception of community in large and
small configurations. Moreover, it molds the discernment of individual
character, addressing in blunt and sometimes veiled tones each defendant,
his victim, and their shared or separate communities.2 A source of rhetoric
and a servant of community as arbiter and guardian, the prosecutor medi-
ates between the accused subjects and victimized objects of crime, spawn-
ing constructive as well as pernicious results.
The culture of criminal law and justice serves as a backdrop for the
American prosecutor. The contemporary figure of the prosecutor springs
from the historical evolution of the adversarial criminal trial.22 Prior schol-
arly work on the cultural authority and social role of the prosecutor refers
to both federal and state law-enforcement functions.2 This familiar work
highlights the prosecutor's pivotal role in making law and in establishing
order.24 It also underscores his role as an agent of the people and his
19. On the social function and meaning of deterrence, see Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social
Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349, 362-94 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of
Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413,419-35 (1999).
20. Cultural attributions inform common understandings of criminal behavior. See, e.g., James J.
Sing, Culture as Sameness: Toward a Synthetic View of Provocation and Culture in the Criminal Law,
108 YALE LJ. 1845, 1849-64 (1999); Leti Volpp, Blaming Culture for Bad Behavior, 12 YALE J.L. &
HUIAN. 89, 109-16 (2000).
21. Encrusted by culture and society but self-animated, rhetoric produces a kind of subjectivity of
knowledge. See Francis J. Mootz III, The Quest to Reprogram Cultural Software: A Hermeneutical
Response to Jack Balkin's Theory of Ideology and Critique, 76 CH.-KENT L. REV. 945, 958 (2000)
("Rhetorical knowledge emerges out of the preunderstandings embedded in patterns of social discourse
and interaction, but it is distinguished from mere convention by the inventive representation and
reinscription of'prejudices' by the rhetorical actor.").
22. See, e.g., DAVID J.A. CAIRNS, ADVOCACY AND THE MAKING OF THE ADVERSARIAL CRIMINAL
TRIAL, 1800-1865, at 163-80 (1998); JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR
IDENTITY 3-43 (1980).
23. On federal law-enforcement functions, see H.W. Perry, Jr. United States Attorneys-Whom
Shall They Serve?, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 131-43 (1998); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A.
Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207, 224-45 (2000). On state law-
enforcement functions, see William F. McDonald, The Prosecutor's Domain, in THE PROSECUTOR 15-
51 (William F. McDonald ed., 1979).
24. See, e.g., David T. Johnson, The Organization of Prosecution and the Possibility of Order, 32
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 247, 279-97 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, Three Conceptions of Federal Criminal-
Lawmaking, I BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 5, 15-22 (1997); Roberta S. Karmel, Creating Lmv at the Securities
and Erchange Commission: The Lmayer as Prosecutor, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 38-44
(1998).
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mission in obtaining justice across a spectrum of cases.2 5 It points as well
to his transactional role in plea negotiations and in victim counseling.26
For federal and state prosecutors, discretion lies at the heart of their
institutional function in litigation, bargaining, and counseling. The regula-
tory scope of federal and state prosecutorial discretion continues to be a
matter of controversy.27 Prosecutorial misconduct, still noteworthy in clos-
ing arguments and in grand jury investigations, continues to cause unease,
particularly with regard to the constitutional repercussions of such miscon-
duct and the curative adequacy of judicial remedies.28
A rising interest in race now joins the ongoing debate over prosecuto-
rial regulation.29 This interest surpasses the recent attention paid to bias-
induced jury contamination, selective prosecution, and prosecutorial ap-
peals to prejudice.3" Cast more broadly, the interest is linked to mounting
evidence of inequality in the criminal-justice system.3 The colonial roots
of racial inequality and its ineradicable connection to racially dispropor-
tionate rates of crime and urban decay, as well as disparate forms of
25. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607,
612-25 (1999); Alan Vinegrad, The Role of the Prosecutor: Serving the Interests ofAll the People, 28
HOFSTRA L. REV. 895, 897-902 (2000).
26. On plea negotiations under the federal sentencing guidelines, see Cynthia K.Y. Lee, From
Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal Prosecutor's Expanding Power Over Substantial
Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 199, 216-39 (1997); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H.
Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its
Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1284, 1289-1311 (1997). On counseling
victims, see Stacy Caplow, What If There Is No Client?: Prosecutors as "Counselors" of Crime
Victims, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 26-43 (1998); Kirk J. Nahra, The Role of Victims in Criminal
Investigations and Prosecutions, PROSECUTOR, July-Aug. 1999, at 28, 30-32.
27. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, A Bludgeon by Any Other Name: The Misuse of "Ethical Rules"
Against Prosecutors to Control the Lav of the State, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 665, 753-79 (1996); Fred
C. Zacharias, The ProfessionalDiscipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REv. 721, 725-41, 765-73 (2001);
Note, Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment, 113 HARV. L. REV.
2080, 2083-93 (2000).
28. See Robert W. Clifford, Identifying and Preventing Improper Prosecutorial Comment in
Closing Argument, 51 ME. L. REV. 241, 257-67 (1999); Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct
and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 815-31 (1999); Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial
Misconduct in Grand Jury Investigations, 51 S.C. L. REV. 1, 10-25 (1999); Kenneth Rosenthal,
Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case Studies in an Emerging
Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 945-61 (1998).
29. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Starr Is to Clinton as Regular Prosecutors Are to Blacks, 40 B.C. L.
REV. 705, 708-15 (1999); Laura E. G6mez, Race, Colonialism, and Criminal Lav: Mexicans and the
American Criminal Justice System in Territorial Nev Mexico, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 1129, 1174-95
(2000).
30. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial Court Judges, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 475, 477-500 (1998); Andrea D. Lyon, Setting the Record Straight: A Proposal for
Handling Prosecutorial Appeals to Racial, Ethnic or Gender Prejudice During Trial, 6 MICHt J. RACE
& L. 319, 324-35 (2001); Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the
Pitfalls ofArmstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 624-66 (1998).
31. See generally DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 16-62, 101-68 (1999).
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punishment, prompt both the local and national turn to community prose-
cution.
B. Locating Prosecution in Community
The literature of community prosecution defines the movement in the
fairly "amorphous" terms of grassroots activism and outreach.32 Boldly
labeled as "the next stage" in the evolution of the conventional "charge-
convict-sentence" paradigm,33 the movement appears to be less of a para-
digm shift or full-blown program than a public-safety strategy aimed at
combating neighborhood crime and increasing civic empowerment.
34
Building upon popular theories of community-police partnership to build
nimble, locally adaptable strategic organizations,35  the movement
32. See CATHERINE M. COLES ET AL., PROSECUTION IN THE COMMUNITY: A STUDY OF
EMERGENT STRATEGIES-A CROSS SITE ANALYSIS, 34-115 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't
Program in Criminal Justice Policy ed., Harvard Univ. 1998); Barbara Boland, Community
Prosecution: Portland's Experience, in CONMUNITY JUSTICE: AN EMERGING FIELD 253-77 (David R.
Karp ed., 1998); Catherine M. Coles, Street Fighting Man: In Courts and D.A. 's Offices, "Community
Prosecution" Is the New Watchword, NEw DEMOCRAT, May-June 1997, at 20; Russ Freyman, D.A.s in
the Streets, GOVERNING MAG., Sept. 1998, at 28; Sarah Glazer, Community Prosecution, 10 CQ
RESEARCHER 1011 (2000); Paula Park, DAs Still Getting Out on Street: After 10 years, Community
Prosecution Is Growing; Some Worry About Funding, 87 A.B.A. J. 26 (2001); Norma Mancini Stevens,
Defining Community Prosecution, PROSECUTOR Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 13.
33. See Catherine M. Coles & George L. Kelling, Prevention Through Community Prosecution,
136 PUB. INT. 69, 72-83 (1999); Thompson, supra note 2, at 326.
34. See Douglas F. Gansler, Implementing Community Prosecution in Montgomery County,
Maryland, PROSECUTOR, July-Aug. 2000, at 30, 32 (2000) ("[F]ield community prosecutors build
partnerships with the police, citizen groups, faith-based organizations, schools and businesses in pursuit
of improved public safety."); Eric H. Holder, Jr., Community Prosecution, PROSECUTOR, May-June
2000, at 31. Holder states:
Community prosecution is not just a new program, it is a new strategy, a better way we-as
prosecutors-can do our job. By working directly with the community and learning its
problems and concerns and by becoming team players with other law enforcement agencies,
prosecutors will be able to respond more effectively to the criminal justice problems in our
neighborhoods.
Id. at 31-32.
35. See Barbara Boland, What Is Community Prosecution?, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Aug. 1996, at
35, 38. Boland comments:
To be effective, the new approach requires a highly flexible organization that allows NDAs
[neighborhood district attorneys] to shape responses and strategies to meet the different needs
of different neighborhoods. What concerns residents of one neighborhood may be irrelevant
to another. Moreover, neighborhood conditions change over time, and street behaviors are
dynamic and constantly changing, making prescribed operations of no value. Organizational
capacity to adapt is essential.
Id. Gansler likewise states:
In order to most effectively align prosecutorial resources with community needs and enable
prosecutors to solve problems in partnership with the community, prosecutors need to be in
the community daily. Only by having a daily presence in the community are prosecutors able
to both gauge the seriousness of the community's public safety problems and play a positive
role in their solution. In order to do this, prosecutors must be working side by side with the
other primary public safety officials: the police.
Gansler, supra note 34, at 31.
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postulates that local quality-of-life crimes36 contribute to neighborhood
blight and escalate criminal violence. Accordingly, it endorses community
outreach through public-private ventures between government and non-
governmental organizations and through need-specific local prosecutorial
case and neighborhood assignments.37 Proponents of this neighborhood-
based assignment system laud "sending assistant district attorneys into the
streets as a way of making a highly visible statement against the stubborn
persistence of neighborhood crime and minor urban disorder."38
The emerging prosecutorial embrace of community arises from cus-
tomary inclinations toward crime prevention and law enforcement, in effect
complementing the trend in community policing. The programs contem-
plate an assortment of community-based initiatives aimed chiefly at curb-
ing the public violence of the street, but they are also generalizable and
hence roughly applicable to the private violence of the home as well.4" Like
other crime-fighting initiatives, these pilot programs raise issues of priority
and proportionality in prosecution.4' Priority concerns the ranking or order-
ing of anticrime initiatives. Proportionality refers to the correspondence
between the charging and sentencing of the offender and the nature of his
crime. For the moment, no clear sense of priority among program initia-
tives seems to have materialized. Instead, local prosecutors typically seem
to take up initiatives on a pragmatic case-by-case basis, their decisions
36. Both the community-prosecution and community-policing movements call attention to
quality-of-life crimes, defining such crimes broadly to include loitering, panhandling, prostitution,
truancy, vandalism, even graffiti. See Freyman, supra note 32, at 28. Freyman observes:
Community prosecution is an outgrowth of community policing. Prosecutors, like 1990s
urban beat cops, are assigned to a small area and told to respond to grassroots concerns. They
conduct meetings with business and community leaders, and deal with any crime, however
minor, that affects the social fabric of the jurisdiction.
Id.
37. See Holder, supra note 34, at 32 ("Establishing partnerships with the community and law
enforcement as well as strong and real working relationships with other public and private agencies, is
a key element to a successful community prosecution approach."); Gansler, supra note 34, at 30
("Prosecutors handle only cases arising from their [county police] districts and are assigned to specific
beats and to schools within the police district for purposes of fostering community outreach."); Brian
Forst, Prosecutors Discover the Community, 84 JUDICATURE 135, 135 (2000) ("A common
denominator is that the programs typically aim to redirect service outside the court, with more
sensitivity to the cultures and special needs of those served.").
38. See Freyman, supra note 32, at 28.
39. See George L. Kelling et al., The Bureau of Justice Assistance Comprehensive Communities
Program: A Preliminary Report, NAT'L INST. JUST. RES. IN BRIEF, June 1998, at 1 (describing
comprehensive community initiatives in policing); Susan P. Weinstein, Community
Prosecution: Community Policing's Legal Partner, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Apr. 1998, at 19.
40. See Mike Brogen & Sharon Harkin, Community Rules Preventing Re-Offending by Child Sex
Abusers, 28 INT'L J. Soc. L. 45, 50-67 (2000); Richard Devine, Targeting High Risk Domestic
Violence Cases: The Cook County, Chicago, Experience, PROSECUTOR, Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 30.
41. See Kevin M. Burke, A Prosecution Model for the Millennium: The Continuum from
Prevention to Priority Prosecution, 34 NEw ENG. L. REV 651, 652-53 (2000); Rory K. Little,




compelled by public need and popular outcry. Similarly, no definite sense
of proportionality in prosecutorial charging has emerged, though subject-
matter trends (for example, in the case of quality-of-life crimes) seem iden-
tifiable. In the main, local prosecutors seem to press crime-fighting initia-
tives with more freewheeling than channeled discretion.
Community-prosecution programs provide a special opportunity for
federal and state cooperation. Venues of cooperative federalism flow from
the augmented federal role in revitalizing communities and preventing
crime and violence. The U.S. Department of Justice has nationwide reach
to implement the objectives of public safety and neighborhood justice un-
der federal crime-control legislation authorizing local program implemen-
tation by U.S. Attorneys' Offices. 2 The national impetus is a byproduct of
the federalization of local crime.43 Intended to reduce crime, the federaliza-
tion drive manifests itself in the congressional enactment of numerous
crime-control and law-enforcement statutes.44 That cumulative legislation
authorizes the issuance of crime-prevention and community-based justice
grants to states and local prosecutors.4 ' Related provisions require prosecu-
tors to cooperate and coordinate with educational, social service, and
community resources to develop and deliver violence-prevention programs,
especially those serving young offenders and victims.
46
Congressional crime-control statutes enacted in the last two decades
have fueled the growth of a diverse range of community-prosecution pro-
grams. Encouraged by the Department of Justice,47 the programs strive to
integrate local community initiatives and perspectives into the federal and
state criminal-justice system and law-enforcement process. Examples of
42. See DANIEL McGILLIS & JOAN MULLEN, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS: AN ANALYSIS
OF POTENTIAL MODELS 25-30 (1977); Catherine Conly & Daniel McGillis, The Federal Role in
Revitalizing Communities and Preventing and Controlling Crime and Violence, NAT'L INST. JUST. J.,
Aug. 1996, at 24; Symposium, The Office of U.S. Attorney and Public Safety: A Brief History
Prepared for the "Changing Role of U.S. Attorneys' Offices in Public Safety" Symposium, 28 CAP. U.
L. REv. 753, 762-69 (2000); see, e.g., Elizabeth Glazer, How Federal Prosecutors Can Reduce Crime,
136 PUB. INT. 85, 88-93 (1999); Elizabeth Glazer, Thinking Strategically: How Federal Prosecutors
Can Reduce Violent Crime, 26 FORDHAhI URB. L.J. 573, 581-605 (1999).
43. See JAmES A. STRAZZELLA, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 5-24, 32-35 (1998);
John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TENtP. L. REv. 673,
677-89 (1999).
44. See, e.g., Public Safety Partnership and Community Policing Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 3711
(2001); Safe Streets for Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13701 (2001); Victims of Child Abuse Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. § 13001 (2001); Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, 42
U.S.C. § 7101 (2001).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 13861 (2001).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 13862 (2001). Legislative history, albeit scant, reinforces this purpose. See
H.R. REP. No. 103-711 (1994); 140 CONG. REC. H2260 (1994).
47. See Robert L. Jackson, "Community Prosecuting" Wins Fans, Federal Funds, L.A. TINMS,
Mar. 30, 1999, at A5; Sam Skolnik, DOJ Puts Big Bucks Behind Community Prosecution, LEGAL
Tims, Feb. 8, 1999 at 1; Five Communities Receive Grants for Community Prosecution: Philosophy
Allows Prosecutors to Consider Community's Perspectives During Process, PRESS RELEASE
NEWSWIRE, Mar. 11, 1999.
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community-prosecution programs span numerous urban and suburban ge-
ographies, including Albany, Austin, Baltimore, Boston, Buffalo, Chicago,
Denver, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Milwaukee, New York City, Oakland,
Phoenix, Portland, South Bend, Washington, D.C., and a wide array of
counties.48
The central tendency common to these widespread, often nascent pro-
grams is community outreach. Prosecutorial outreach involves more than
attendance at community meetings and participation in police roll calls or
patrols. It entails placement of prosecutors in police precincts and district
attorney community branch offices, coordination with governmental-
housing and social-services agencies, and engagement in neighborhood
crime prevention and urban-revitalization partnerships with for-profit enti-
ties and nonprofit organizations.49
In summarizing these disparate programs, Thompson finds no "self-
defining" vision or unitary meaning inherent to the concept of community
prosecution.0 Instead, he points to several strands interknitting the struc-
ture of programs and the design of local offices. Fundamental to both are
decentralization and integration. Decentralization refers to the reallocation
of resources and the reassignment of personnel (lawyers, community work-
ers, and investigative and administrative staff) from traditional case-
oriented courthouse offices to police precincts and neighborhood-based
storefront offices. Integration refers to the incorporation of community
prosecutors throughout traditional courthouse offices, rather than their
separation into a discrete non-traditional unit. It also relates to the
48. See, e.g., Barbara Boland, Community Prosecution in Washington, D.C.: The U.S. Attorney's
Fifth District Pilot Project, NAT'L INST. JUST. RES. REP., Apr. 2001 (discussing community
prosecution in Washington, D.C.); Barbara Boland, Community Prosecution: The Manhattan
Experiment, in CRIME AND PLACE-PLENARY PAPERS OF THE 1997 CONFERENCE ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, NAT'L INST. JUST. (1998) (discussing community prosecution in
New York City); Janet Elliott, Different Takes, TEXAS LAW., Oct. 28, 1996, at I (discussing county-
based community prosecution); Douglas F. Gansler, Implementing Community Prosecution in
Montgomery County, Maryland, PROSECUTOR, July-Aug. 2000, at 20 (same); Michael B. Golden,
Teaching Tolerance Can Re-educate Those Who Hate, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 23, 2001, at 39
(discussing community prosecution in Chicago); Pat Kossan & William Hermann, Program Targets
Problem Landlords, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 19, 2000, at A27 (discussing community prosecution in
Phoenix); Henry K. Lee, Oakland Tries Community Prosecuting; Crime Program Spotlights Needs in
Neighborhoods, S.F. CHRON., July 24, 1999, at A15 (discussing community prosecution in Oakland);
Sukhjit Purewal, Neighborhood Watch, RECORDER, July 19, 2000, at 1 (discussing community
prosecution in Santa Clara County); Christopher Toth, Community Prosecution Program Aims at
Securing Quality of Life, S. BEND TRI., Aug. 20, 2000, at B6 (discussing community prosecution in
South Bend).
49. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 354-60; see also Richard A. Devine, Chicago's Approach to
Community Prosecution, PROSECUTOR, Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 35; Steve Dillingham & Michael Kuykendall,
New Directions for Community Prosecution, PROSECUTOR, July-Aug. 2001, at 30; Mama McLendon et
al., Community Justice Program of the Howard County State's Attorney's Office, PROSECUTOR, Jan.-
Feb. 2002, at 38; Elaine Nugent & Gerard R. Rainville, The State of Community Prosecution: Results
of a National Survey, PROSECUTOR, Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 26.
50. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 354-55.
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interaction of prosecutors with the police, victims, offenders, and neighbor-
hood groups. For Thompson, even the best of the decentralized and well-
integrated community-prosecution experiments suffer from the absence of
a unifying vision. What vision exists, he observes, "remains inchoate in
virtually every sense of the word: just beginning to develop; lacking
structure; even chaotic."'"
Thompson's trenchant observation and his careful synthesis of the
concrete structural impediments confronting community-prosecution pro-
grams underscore the importance of binding the movement to a strong
normative foundation. At its most robust, that foundation is comprised of
the norms of collaborative citizenship, state decentralization and account-
ability, and participatory democracy. Those norms inform the jurispru-
dence of liberalism, the community-lawyering tradition, and the theory of
restorative justice.
To cohere and effectively reach out to impoverished communities of
color, the community-prosecution movement must combine the goals of
crime prevention and criminal justice with the methods of neighborhood
revitalization and the values of democratic citizenship. The community-
lawyering tradition provides an approach to neighborhood defense and rec-
lamation. The theory of restorative justice offers a model of democratic
citizenship. Bundled together, they map a normative and practical strategy
to guide community-prosecution programs in the pursuit of citizen-state
collaboration and grassroots justice initiatives aimed at alleviating poverty,
powerlessness, and racial violence.
The community-lawyering tradition evolved out of the grassroots ad-
vocacy and organizing initiatives of the Great Society era. 2 Dedicated to
the innovative delivery of neighborhood legal services to indigent clients
besieged by urban deprivation and pathology,53 the tradition engrafts the
51. Id, at 360.
52. See Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic
Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 659, 682-90 (1987-88); Raymond H. Brescia et al.,
Who's in Charge, Anyway? A Proposal for Community-Based Legal Services, 25 FORDHAM URit. L.J.
831, 848-62 (1998); Roger Conner, Community Oriented Lawyering: An Emerging Approach to Legal
Practice, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Jan. 2000, at 27, 28-32; Michael Diamond, Community
Lmyering: Revisiting the Old Neighborhood, 32 COLUm. HuM. RTS. Rv. 67, 101-26 (2000); Edward
V. Sparer, The New Public Law: The Relationship of State Administration to the Legal Problems of the
Poor, in COMMUNITY ACTION AGAINST POVERTY: READINGS FROM THE MOBILIZATION EXPERIENCE
302-20 (George A. Brager & Francis P. Purcell eds., 1967); Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-
Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L. Rv. 1101, 1129-55 (1990); Zenobia Lai et al.,
The Lessons of the Parcel C Struggle: Reflections on Community Lawyering, 6 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM.
L.J. 1, 23-34 (2000).
53. See Robin S. Golden, Toward a Model of Community Representation for Legal Assistance
Lmvyering: Examining the Role of Legal Assistance Agencies in Drug-Related Evictions from Public
Housing, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 527, 529-35, 555-61 (1998); see also Jan Stokley & Anthony
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well-worn norms and practices of group representation 54 onto the arenas of
civil rights and poverty law." Deploying a mix of legal remedies and social
reforms, community lawyers tend to assert political rather than cultural
commitments. Community representation of individuals and groups, how-
ever, melds political and cultural practices, particularly in indigenous
communities.16 At this level, legal action acquires the form of cultural ac-
tion. Culture holds particular bearing for the goal of empowerment. 7
Doubtless the notion of empowerment suffers from conceptual elusiveness.
In fact, empowerment takes different forms: cultural, sociolegal, and po-
litical. Often these forms converge and must be addressed as a whole; at
other times they break apart or must be disentangled. 8
The connection between empowerment and identity in the commu-
nity-lawyering tradition also appears in the restorative-justice movement.
The norms and practices of restorative justice hinge on empowering the
objects of crime (victims) and the subjects of criminal justice (defendants)
in the context of civic community and collaborative justice. 9
Daysog, Neighborhood Organizations Respond to Street Crime, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 479, 482-83
(1994).
54. See GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE
LAW PRACTICE 11-82 (1992); Janine Sisak, If the Shoe Doesn't Fit... Reformulating Rebellious
Lawyering to Encompass Community Group Representation, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 873, 876-81
(1998); Ann Southworth, Collective Representation for the Disadvantaged: Variations in Problems of
Accountability, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2449, 2455-72 (1999).
55. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 39-169 (1991); STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND POLITICAL CHANGE 131-48 (1974); STEPHEN L. WASBY, RACE RELATIONS LITIGATION IN AN AGE
OF COMPLEXITY 99-140, 330-37 (1995); Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the "Myth of Rights" in Civil
Rights andPoverty Practice, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 469, 477-508 (1999).
56. Law and legal action in civil and criminal contexts impinge upon culture and foment cultural
action directly when defending the prerogatives of custom or language and indirectly when facilitating
education or expression in the arts. See Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the] Road Back In: Community
Lawyering in Indigenous Communities, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 557, 571-90 (1999); Jeff Streiffer, If You
Can't Get There from Here, Then That's Not Where You Need to Go: Epistemological Priority
CulturalAction, andLavyeringfor Social Change, 19 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 397, 405-12, 423-
46(1997).
57. See Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48
UCLA L. REV. 443, 460-79 (2001); William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community
Organizers: Lawyering for Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 455,
464-79 (1995).
58. Both law school clinics and lawyering skills courses increasingly recognize this
multidimensionality and its critical linkage to identity, narrative, and community. See Phyllis Goldfarb,
A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599,
1674-98 (1991); Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity,
Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1807, 1809-22 (1993).
59. See IAN BROWNLEE, COMMUNITY PUNISHMENT: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 5-61 (1998);
Gordon Bazemore, The "Community" in Community Justice: Issues, Themes, and Questions for the
New Neighborhood Sanctioning Models, 19 JUST. SYS. J. 193 (1997); Todd R. Clear & David R. Karp,
Toward the Ideal of Community Justice, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Oct. 2000, at 20, 21-27; see also PHILIP
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Community-based empowerment strategies linked to neighborhood preser-
vation and improvement tactics, citizen-state street-level collaborations,
and equal justice initiatives are predicated on a transformative vision of
identity as protean and reconstructive. Such a vision renews a civic obliga-
tion to criminal adversaries and regenerates a civic commitment to society
as a whole. Intimately tied to both the victim and the accused, that trans-
formative vision is crucial to restorative justice.60
Within the restorative-justice movement, victims and defendants con-
struct identity and are in turn constructed and, indeed, reconstructed by the
agents and institutions of criminal justice and their own cohort groups
(families, friends, neighbors). In this way, the process of identity construc-
tion is both self-directed and structurally situated by community, culture,
and society. Although historically bounded, this process is dynamic and
shifting, undergoing internal and external revision in response to dialogue
and domination. The agents of the criminal-justice system-police, prose-
cutors, defenders, and judges-participate in that process through the iden-
tity-making practices of arrest, advocacy, and adjudication. For these
external agents, the social construction of identity occurs in institutional
settings: police precincts, prosecution and defender offices, courts, and
prisons. For victims and defendants, those settings are coercive theaters of
domination where identity as a criminal object or subject is manufactured
and imposed for instrumental purposes, for example in plea bargaining.
Instrumentalism of this sort serves the ends of law enforcement and order
maintenance.
However favorable this outcome, the means to achieve such ends are
hardly benign. Embodied in racialized identity-making practices of polic-
ing and prosecution, they preempt collaboration between the victim and the
accused and hence preclude transformative dialogue. Restorative justice
regimes reconstruct the identity of the victim and the accused to invite col-
laboration and permit dialogue. The regimes honor identity as an expres-
sion of the self, a product of institutional molding, and the complex
outgrowth of multiple groups and communities. Thus revised, identity
guides the application of the restorative principles of reconciliation and
restitution.61 It determines the form of neighborhood-sanctioning models,
SELZNICK, THE MORAL COM ION-WEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY, 428-
76 (1992).
60. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION 54-107 (1989); MARTIN
WRIGHT, JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS: A RESTORATIVE RESPONSE TO CRIME 100-31 (2d ed.
1996); Russ Immarigeon, Restorative Justice, Juvenile Offenders and Crime Victims: A Review of the
Literature, in RESTORATIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE HARM OF YOUTH CRIME 305-25
(Gordon Bazemore & Lode Walgrave eds., 1999).
61. See John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?,
46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1743-50 (1999); Robert B. Coates, Victim-Offender Reconciliation Programs
in North America: An Assessment, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RESTITUTION, AND RECONCILIATION 125-34
(Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1990); Laura Nader & Elaine Combs-Schilling, Restitution in
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such as reintegrative shaming ceremonies.2 And it gives meaning to com-
munity-based crime prevention and criminal justice.63 Having outlined the
normative base and organizational structure of community-prosecution
programs, this Essay turns next to their jurisprudential underpinnings.
II
COMMUNITY JURISPRUDENCE
The norms and practices common to the community-prosecution
movement may be traced to the jurisprudence of liberalism and its often
antagonistic offspring, feminism and critical race theory. Although none of
these jurisprudential schools of thought are entirely expressed and inte-
grated into the content of community-prosecution programs, their strands
are visible in action and by design. Liberalism, rendered in republican and
communitarian styles, is epitomized by the notions of autonomy, duty, and
deliberation. Feminism is exemplified by the concepts of agency, trust, and
reciprocity. Critical race theory is embodied by the ideas of identity, em-
powerment, and community. Community-prosecution programs contain
each of these jurisprudential elements. The task here is to discern which are
blossoming into dominance and which are falling into subordinating dor-
mancy.
A. Liberal Theory
Liberalism is the essence of American public philosophy. It empha-
sizes the autonomy of the rational self, private-contractarian obligation be-
tween free economic agents, and state-circumscribed forms of public
deliberation. When exercised for the self, autonomy enables individuals to
flourish as isolated persons, while maintaining room for relationships and
alliances based on consent. When exercised in association with others,
autonomy enables groups to muster collective action. Under liberalism,
individual autonomy, experienced as personhood, is intimately connected
to moral responsibility. Individuals achieve autonomy through rational
choice and the acceptance of responsibility. Rational choice implies moral
Cross-Cultural Perspective, in RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF
SANCTIONS 27-44 (Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway eds., 1975).
62. On shaming, see Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform,
3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 645, 650-73 (1997); Michael Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment
Policies in America, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1751, 1763-71 (1999); Richard Young & Benjamin Goold,
Restorative Police Cautioning in Aylesbury-From Degrading to Reintegrative Shaming Ceremonies?,
1999 CRIM. L. REV. 126, 135-37.
63. On community justice, see Bazemore, supra note 59; Leena Kurki, Restorative and
Community Justice in the United States, 27 CRIME & JUST. 235, 243-63 (2000). See also Lois Presser &
Elaine Gunnison, Strange Bedfellows: Is Sex Offender Notification a Form of Community Justice?, 45
CRIME & DELINQ. 299, 303-10 (1999); Richard G. Zevitz & Mary Ann Farkas, Sex Offender
Community Notification: Assessing the Impact in Wisconsin, NAT'L INST. JUST. RES. BRIEF, Dec.
2000, at I, 10-I1.
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agency. Responsibility posits a sense of integrity revealed in reasoned con-
stancy and fidelity. Taken as a whole, moral agency and integrity furnish
the basis for consent, bestowing legitimacy on private-exchange relation-
ships and public-governance alliances.'
Group autonomy, experienced as common-interest friendship or con-
tractual association, also links to responsibility and consent.6" Groups attain
autonomy under liberalism through collective decision making and ac-
countability. Collective decision making, like autonomous decision mak-
ing, indicates agency, but of a plural sort. Accountability in the same way
conveys integrity and its baseline of loyalty. The integrity of group deci-
sions, and joint liability for their consequences, rests on the shared giving
of consent in private and public transactions of economic value or political
ratification.66
In communities of color, as elsewhere, individuals exercise autonomy
both in solitude and in groups. Unlike individuals affiliated with economi-
cally prosperous majority-color communities, however, individuals within
communities of color often labor under the burdens of living and working
in crime-ridden, abandoned inner cities beleaguered by poverty and unem-
ployment. Crime and privation may weaken the conditions for autonomy's
actualization, though they do not preclude it.
Community prosecution in a liberal paradigm should strengthen the
conditions of economic and political autonomy for individuals and groups
in impoverished communities, especially communities of color. This result
can be accomplished by mobilizing neighbors and revitalizing neighbor-
hoods in a campaign against crime, decay, and displacement. Aiding in the
rebuilding of the social infrastructure of communities enhances their
chances of economic viability and their members' opportunities for politi-
cal participation.
Mutual obligation, the centerpiece of liberal democratic community,
provides a basis for the work of community-prosecution programs. Mutual-
ity in the group decision making of civic participation, and the acknowl-
edgement of a duty to others in socioeconomic networks, explicates the
nature of this obligation.67 Obligation denotes citizenship and at least a
64. Crudely fashioned for the limited purposes of this Essay, this distillation of political
principals resembles the classical version of liberal contractarianism espoused by Rawls. See JOHN
RAWVLS, JUSICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 95-96 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
65. See Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and
Community, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 2-7 (1989).
66. See Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy,
85 GEO. L.J. 2073,2079-81 (1997). See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
67. See Christopher Heath Wellman, Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation, 111
ETHICS 735, 740-50 (2001); Christopher Heath Wellman, Friends, Compatriots, and Special Political
Obligations, 29 PoL. THEORY 217,230-33 (2001).
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qualified faith in community representation, 68 even when common interests
run thin.
Citizenship is realized through private and public modes of inter-
course.69 Where badly integrated into society, race affects both modes of
citizenship, restricting private and public interchange between majority and
minority groups and undermining minority-group status, for example, in
the realm of the family.7" Failed minority-group integration into the ranks
of majority-group citizenship is an affliction borne of difference and domi-
nation. Difference creates vulnerability in the cultural, economic, political,
and social standing of the minority group and reinforces the legitimacy of
majority-group domination. Multicultural difference magnifies civic vul-
nerability, particularly for women of color.7 That sense of vulnerability
invades private and public relationships and spaces.72
Communities of color suffer a pronounced sense of vulnerability on
individual and collective planes. When beset by internal crime and sur-
rounding poverty, the communities experience the violence of fear and im-
poverishment. In the private sphere of family and home, that experience
may take the form of abuse, neglect, and helplessness. In the public sphere
of the marketplace, the experience may manifest as employment discrimi-
nation and workplace exploitation, for example in the denial of a living
wage.
A means of surmounting vulnerability, liberal autonomy and mutual-
ity combine to erect the framework for individuals and groups to engage in
public deliberation. Shared deliberation and tolerance are crucial to liberal
community. Deliberative tolerance in fact supplies a means of abiding dis-
agreement and dissent. Deficient in empathy, liberal tolerance may falter in
the clash of color and interest-group conflict. Although the deliberative
faith of democratic citizenship survives this deficiency, it struggles to
68. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 3 (1991). Shklar
endows the idea of citizenship with four significant meanings: standing, nationality, active
participation, and ideal republican citizenship. This Essay focuses on the notion of citizenship as
inclusive civic participation. For juridical forms of community representation in the guise of the jury,
see Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community
Representation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 360-76 (1999).
69. See Raia Prokhovnik, Public and Private Citizenship: From Gender Invisibility to Feminist
Inclusiveness, 60 FEMINIST REV. 84, 89-96 (1998).
70. African Americans suffered both antebellum and postbellum statutory restrictions on the right
to marry and maintain a family household. See Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a
Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251,
274-307 (1999).
71. See Romand Coles, Tradition: Feminists of Color and the Torn Virtues of Democratic
Engagement, 29 POL. THEORY 488, 490-96, 501-11 (2001); Ayelet Shachar, On Citizenship and
Multicultural Vulnerability, 28 POL. THEORY 64, 65-70 (2000); Nira Yuval-Davis, Women, Citizenship
and Difference, 57 FEMINIST REV. 4, 8-19 (1997).
72. See Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51
STAN. L. REV. 221,230-37 (1999).
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overcome empathetic deficits in the fractured context of modem multira-
cial society, despite the entreaties of the republican revival.73 To their
credit, civil-society revivalists take seriously liberal claims of citizenship
and collective deliberation.74 The republican canon, however, buttresses
deliberative democracy while underlining its limits as a group-based rem-
edy for minority protest.75 Those limits stifle minority-group participation
in democratic deliberation and lead consequently to political alienation
sometimes manifested in electoral apathy and community uprising. Com-
munitarian doctrine similarly advances the democratic values of public de-
liberation and tolerance but also poorly reconciles competing autonomy
rights76 and conflicting intergroup relations.77 This infirmity pertains to in-
dividual-rights competition, individual- and group-rights conflict, group-
within-group contest, and group-against-group rivalry. That variation is
illustrated by the widely inequitable treatment of minority rights under
communitarian regimes, for instance in contemporary gay-rights strug-
gles.
78
Liberalism in its contractarian, republican, and communitarian guises
struggles to accommodate difference. This struggle is heightened by gender
or sexual ambiguity79 and racial bias8" in criminal law and the criminal-
justice system. Difference, manifested either by ambiguity or deviation,
dictates the cognitive status and interpretive rank of lawbreakers. For Black
lawbreakers, cognitive prisms color identity and interpretive templates si-
lence, and sometimes falsify, narrative. Like all interpretive communities,
liberal regimes inhabit a bounded universe of revelatory narratives. The
narratives permit dialogue under certain accepted conditions of understand-
ing. These conditions stipulate the natural and indeed necessary quality of
race neutrality. Colorblind conditions of this kind, however contrived,
73. See Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society-Revivalists, 75
CHI-KENT L. REv. 301,314-22, 348-53 (2000).
74. See Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal Theory and the
Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 331,354-86 (1994).
75. See Cynthia V. Ward, The Limits of "Liberal Republicanism": Why Group-Based Remedies
aud Republican Citizenship Don't Mix, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 581, 596-606 (1991).
76. See Candace Cummins Gauthier, Moral Responsibility and Respect for Autonomy: Meeting
the Communitarian Challenge, 10 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 337,339-42 (2000).
77. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations after Affirmative
Action, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 1251, 1317-33 (1998); Christopher Heath Wellman, Liberalism,
Communitarianism, and Group Rights, 18 LAw & PHIL. 13, 14-27,33-38 (1999).
78. See Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 615, 622-61 (1992); Carlos A. Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, 85
CORNELL L. REv. 443,510-17 (2000).
79. See Timothy V. Kaufman-Osbom, Reviving the Late Liberal State: On Capital Punishment
in an Age of Gender Confusion, 24 SIGNS 1119, 1122-28 (1999).
80. See Gary Peller, Criminal Laiv, Race, and the Ideology of Bias: Transcending the Critical
Tools of the Sixties, 67 TUL. L. Rv. 2231, 2245-48 (1993).
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fashion a kind of interpretive horizon beyond which meaning is distorted
and understanding is lost.
Ambiguity and bias unsettle the interpretive conditions of liberalism.
They obscure the horizon for understanding difference available to com-
munities. This constraint inhibits legal and political agents, such as prose-
cutors and legislators, from grasping the meaning of difference and
engaging in dialogue about appropriate responses to its varied forms." Un-
surprisingly, the search for responsive-justice communities of moral dis-
cernment," unbridled by a punitive ethos83 and a compulsion toward state
violence, may lead to private-contractual and free-market versions of ethi-
cal conduct in the prosecution of crime. The fruits of that search include
the dubious importation of private and narrow efficiency-based measures
of criminal desert and justice.84
Alternate spaces for accommodating difference in American politics
and society may prove more respectful of identity and receptive to com-
munity than efficiency-based measures. These alternate juridical spaces
may be assembled from local sociolegal settings, perhaps at churches or at
child-care centers, regularly found in communities of color. They also may
be found in the civic and political traditions adjacent to criminal law and
safeguarded by constitutional law.85
Local and national community embrace of difference and diversity
serves important expressive and communicative functions in law and poli-
tics.86 Symbolically, it signals a commitment to inclusion and egalitarian-
ism. Discursively, it sounds themes of equality and conciliation. Few
communities, however, can fully embrace the diversity of multiculturalism
81. See David L. Williams, Dialogical Theories of Justice, 114 TELOS 109, 117-27 (1999).
82. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Towering Figures, Enigmas, and Responsive Communities in
American Legal Ethics, 51 ME. L. REV. 229, 237-38 (1999). Applied to criminal justice, Shaffer's
notion of responsive communities evokes the death-penalty-abolitionist movement. See Anthony V.
Alfieri, Mitigation, Mercy, and Delay: The Moral Politics of Death Penalty Abolitionists, 31 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325 (1996); Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353 (1996).
83. See Markus Dirk Dubber, The Right to Be Punished: Autonomy and Its Demise in Modern
Penal Thought, 16 LAW & HIsT. REV. 113, 119-32 (1998).
84. See Andrew P. Morriss, Returning Justice to Its Private Roots, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 551, 554-
65 (2001) (book review).
85. See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: A
THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 182-259 (1993); Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary
Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. I (1989); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51
VAND. L. REV. 333, 343-75 (1998); Kraig James Powell, The Other Double
Standard: Communitarianism, Federalism, and American Constitutional Law, 7 CONST. L.J. 69, 71-80
(1996); Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REV.
389, 396-404 (1998).
86. See Wibren Van Der Burg, The Expressive and Communicative Functions of Lcnv, Especially
with Regard to Moral Issues, 20 LAW & PHIL. 31, 41-52 (2001).
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with its cacophony of voices and discordant interests." Even outside the
Black/White paradigm, few communities can toil free of racial stereotyp-
ing, as the Asian American experience persistently attests.88 Witnessed and
memorialized in narrative, stereotyping not only endures but also becomes
entangled in the constituent branches of racial identity.89 Feminist legal
theory points out the significance of narrative, its supple form and rich con-
tent, and its intersection with ethnicity, race, and sexuality.9 For an exposi-
tion of the narratives of agency, trust, and reciprocity in community, crime,
and criminal justice, the next section turns to feminist theory.
B. Feminist Theory
Feminist theory exposes both the gendered style and substance of
criminal-law norms and practices. 91 Basic to the feminist contribution is a
subverting analysis of sociolegal power, its disciplining impact, and its re-
lation to distinctive cultures of violence.92 This analytic framework
87. See Chandran Kukathas, Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference, 26
POL. THEORY 686, 687-96 (1998).
88. See generally Rhoda J. Yen, Racial Stereotyping of Asians and Asian Americans and Its
Effect on Criminal Justice: A Reflection on the Wayne Lo Case, 7 ASIAN L.J. 1, 21-22 (2000).
89. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites"?: Race, Sexual
Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1362-78 (2000); see also Darren
Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: "Intersectionality, " "Multidimensionality," and the Development
of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 306-16 (2001) (examining
interrelationships among racism, heterosexism, patriarchy, and class oppression).
90. See Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CALIF. L. REv. 971, 973-1012 (1991);
Margaret H.R. Chon, On the Need for Asian American Narratives in Laiv: Ethnic Specimens, Native
Informants, Storytelling and Silences, 3 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 4, 13-22 (1995); Richard Delgado,
Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2435-41
(1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REv. 607, 611-31 (1994).
91. Research uncovering the quality of gendered virtue and lawbreaking illustrates the feminist
contribution to criminal-law analysis and the criminalization question. See Mary L. Bellhouse, Crimes
and Pardons: Bourgeois Justice, Gendered Virtue, and the Criminalized Other in Eighteenth-Century
France, 24 SIGNS 959, 961-62 (1999); Naomi Calm, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the
Dilemmas of Criminalization, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 817, 818-22 (2000); Kathleen Daly, Women's
Pathways to Felony Court: Feminist Theories of Lmavbreaking and Problems of Representation, in
CRIMINOLOGY AT THE CROSSROADS: FEmiNIST READINGS IN CRIME AND JUSTICE 135-54 (Kathleen
Daly & Lisa Maher eds., 1998); Malcolm M. Feeley & Deborah L. Little, The Vanishing Female: The
Decline of Women in the Criminal Process, 1687-1912, 25 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 719, 721-24, 740-51
(1991); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Criminal Negligence, 1 BUFF. CRIN. L. REv. 431, 434-39 (1998);
Victoria Nourse, The "Normal" Successes and Failures of Feminism and the Criminal Law, 75 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 951, 953-76 (2000); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law,
143 U. PA. L. REv. 2151, 2154-57 (1995); Symposium, Feminism and the Criminal Law, 4 BUFF.
CRni. L. REv. 709 (2001).
92. See Tosha Yvette Foster, From Fear to Rage: Black Rage as a Natural Progression from
and Functional Equivalent of Battered Woman Syndrome, 38 \Wa. & MARY L. REv. 1851, 1858-69
(1997); Ren~e Heberle, Disciplining Gender; Or, Are Women Getting Away with Murder?, 24 SIGNS
1103 (1999); Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist and
Multiculturalist Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36, 43-60
(1995); Andrea C. Westlund, Pre-Modern and Modern Power: Foucault and the Case of Domestic
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
deciphers the coercive forces impinging upon women, as in cases of do-
mestic violence and prostitution,93 and it fashions a different posture to-
ward criminal-law advocacy and adjudication.9 4 The feminist posture
increasingly infuses the lawyering process, 95 litigation strategy,96 and the
legal profession97 with a more activist participatory sensibility applicable to
individual clients, groups, and communities.98 Further, it instills a feminist-
practice ethic of care and caretaking99 vital to fostering democratic com-
munity through group formation and interplay.' 0 This caretaking ethic
connects to feminist ideals of agency, trust, and reciprocity.
The ideals of agency, trust, and reciprocity provide an alternative
jurisprudential foundation for the community-prosecution movement. Tra-
ditionally anchored in the liberal axioms of autonomy, duty, and delibera-
tion, community-prosecution models strain to imbue participants in the
criminal-justice system-defendants, victims, and their communities-
with a sense of moral agency that affords self-directed independent action
without severing the bonds of "other"-affirming collective action. This
strain derives from the solitary, self-referential core of liberal autonomy
that reduces mutuality and obligation to contractual duty and a market-
inspired exchange relationship. Strictly seen, the feeble normative charac-
ter of this relationship, and its crabbed sense of duty, does not exclude the
Violence, 24 SIGNS 1045, 1053-65 (1999) (explicating legal means of disciplining gender roles and
relations).
93. See Vednita Carter & Evelina Giobbe, Duet: Prostitution, Racism, and Feminist Discourse,
10 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 37, 40-45 (1999); Michelle S. Jacobs, Prostitutes, Drug Users, and
Thieves: The Invisible Women in the Campaign to End Violence Against Women, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIv.
RTs. L. REV. 459,464-74 (1999).
94. See Bryna Bogoch, Judging in a 'Different Voice:' Gender and the Sentencing of Violent
Offences in Israel, 27 INT'L J. Soc. L. 51, 52-59 (1999); Susan D. Carle, Gender in the Construction of
the Lawyer's Persona, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 239, 240-46 (1999).
95. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Woman's
Lavyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 49-50 (1985); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia
Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 75, 86-97
(1994).
96. See Ruth Colker, Feminist Litigation: An Oxymoron? A Study of the Briefs Filed in Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 137, 142-68 (1990).
97. On gendered structures and feminist histories in the legal profession, see Barbara Allen
Babcock, Feminist Lawyers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (1998) (book review). See also Kathleen E. Hull &
Robert L. Nelson, Gender Inequality in Lmv: Problems of Structure and Agency in Recent Studies of
Gender in Anglo-American Legal Professions, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 681 (1998) (book review).
98. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1858-68, 1885-98 (1996); Linda G. Mills, Intuition
and Insight: A New Job Description for the Battered Woman's Prosecutor and Other More Modest
Proposals, 7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 183, 187-92 (1997).
99. See Samantha Brennan, Recent Work in Feminist Ethics, 109 ETHICS 858, 867-74 (1999);
Naomi Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 177, 181-88 (2000); Eva Feder
Kittay, A Feminist Public Ethic of Care Meets the New Communitarian Family Policy, 111 ETHICS 523,
532-37 (2001).




joint deliberations of grassroots organization and political governance. But
it condemns such deliberations to a hollow exertion when compared to the
ideal dialogues of trust-based reciprocity.
Feminist theory offers communities of color a glimpse of dialogues
drawn from the self-direction of agency and the mutual devotion of trust.
The resulting reciprocity of motive and means, while resonant of liberalism
and its most altruistic strands of autonomy and obligation, ploughs a dif-
ferent ground for the community-prosecution movement. At a glance, that
ground is more process-oriented and less ends-demarcated. Although traces
of this new ground appear more frequently,01 they are unsettled by the
postmodern discord in feminist legal theory and the consequent fragmenta-
tion of community." z To an extent, upheaval in the feminist movement
seems to be gradually leveling through the convergence of feminist crimi-
nology"3 and performative studies of gender. 14 Whatever convergence
occurs, however, fails to settle the meaning of identity, calculate a formula
for empowerment, or propound a recipe for reconciling multiracial com-
munity. Each of these analytic posts must be dug up and explored before
community prosecution passes jurisprudential muster. Critical race theory
provides the tools for further excavation.
C. Critical Race Theory
The progeny of the civil rights movement, critical race theory gives
contemporary meaning to the concepts of identity, empowerment, and
community in criminal law and the criminal-justice system.I° Sympathetic
to but located at an acute distance from liberal theory, critical race theory
evaluates both procedural and substantive law for signs of de jure or de
facto bias in the construction of identity." 6 It links identity and race
101. See Cynthia Grant Bowman & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminist Legal Theory, Feminist
Lawmaking, and the Legal Profession, 67 FoRDH~m L. Rv. 249,255-71 (1998).
102. See generally Maxine Eichner, On Postmodern Feminist Legal Theory, 36 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 1, 48-76 (2001); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 C-.-KNT L.
REv. 687, 693-709 (2000).
103. See Kerry Carrington, Postmodernism and Feminist Criminologies: Disconnecting
Discourses?, 22 INT'L J. Soc. L. 261,263-71 (1994).
104. See Judith Resnik, Asking about Gender in Courts, 21 SIGNS 952,977-80 (1996).
105. See, e.g., CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER 223-86 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997);
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: HISTORIES, CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS (Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr. et al. eds.)
(forthcoming 2002); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTrING EDGE 179-212 (Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancie eds., 2d ed. 2000); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FoRMED THE
MOVEMENT (Kimberlb Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); Roy L. Brooks & Mary Jo Newborn, Critical Race
Theory and Classical-Liberal Civil Rights Scholarship: A Distinction Without a Difference?, 82 CALIF.
L. REV. 787, 792-803 (1994).
106. See generally BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT Now I SEE: WHITE RACE
CONSCIOUSNESS & THE LAW 19-116 (1998) (discussing bias in substantive law); Darryl K. Brown, The
Role of Race in Jury Impartiality and Venue Transfers, 53 MD. L. REv. 107, 113-24 (1994) (discussing
bias in procedural law); M. Shanara Gilbert, An Ounce of Prevention: A Constitutional Prescription
2002] 1487
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
consciousness17 to the images and classifications of color in culture and
commerce.' Moreover, it ties identity to privilege.0 9 This tie foments a
kind of identity suspicion that urges the interrogation of racial distinctions
in cognition and interpretation."0 Reproachful of privilege, identity suspi-
cion offers a method by which to reach beyond the notion of Blackness to
investigate multiracial categories, for example Latino/a and Asian
American groupings of pan-racial ethnicity."' Identity suspicion breeds
resistance when used to evaluate the racial tenor of crime and criminal jus-
tice.
Under critical race theory, resistance serves as an organizing principle
and a cognitive precept. It guides the grassroots struggle for empowerment
and community, insinuating itself into individual communications and
group colloquies. Resistance also steers the interpretation of cultural arti-
facts and social structures, disinterring animus from the popular imagina-
tion and its institutional adaptations.
The predicate of empowerment, resistance is essential to community.
It galvanizes relationships of union behind a universal cause. That cause
may be singular or manifold, and it may range from culture to politics.
When gathered outside or in opposition to the state, resistance targets a
common oppressor. Honing in on a lone target frequently overcomes inter-
necine disagreement. Granted, crystallizing oppression in this way may
for Choice of Venue in Racially Sensitive Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1855, 1887-1935 (1993)
(same).
107. See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 763-811 (1990) (contrasting
integrationism and Black nationalism).
108. See Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1154-79 (2000); Hazel Waters,
Putting on 'Uncle Tom 'on the Victorian Stage, 42 RACE & CLASS 29, 39-43 (2001).
109. See John A. Powell, Whites Will Be Whites: The Failure to Interrogate Racial Privilege, 34
U.S.F. L. REv. 419,421-27 (2000).
110. See R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection
Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1075, 1081-1115 (2001); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With an
Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial Profiling, 74 TUL.
L. REv. 1409, 1416-25 (2000).
111. Still inchoate, that method is susceptible to the same essentialist tendency plaguing feminist
legal theory. See, e.g., Linz Audain, Critical Cultural Law and Economics, the Culture of
Deindividualization, the Paradox of Blackness, 70 IND. L.J. 709, 715-34 (1995); Kitty Calavita, The
Paradoxes of Race, Class, Identity, and "Passing": Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 1882-1910,
25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 10-31 (2000); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Forevord: Identity, Democracy,
Communicative Power, Inter/National Labor Rights and the Evolution of LatCrit Theory and
Community, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 575, 586-629 (1999); Janine Young Kim, Are Asians Black?: The
Asian-American Civil Rights Agenda and the Contemporary Significance of the Black/White Paradigm,
108 YALE L.J. 2385, 2393-2408 (1999); Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM.
L. REv. 1181, 1185-1204 (2001). The added layers of class and gender in racial constructions
exacerbate that tendency. See, e.g., Clark D. Cunningham & N.R. Madhava Menon, Race, Class,
Caste... ? Rethinking Affirmative Action, 97 MICH. L. Rev. 1296, 1302-07 (1999) (discussing class);
Joan Williams, Implementing Antiessentialism: How Gender Wars Turn into Race and Class Conflict,
15 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 41, 61-72 (1999).
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bring only a momentary halt to internal dissent. Nonetheless temporary
cessation may prove imperative to community-building objectives.
Fundamental to empowerment and community, resistance is forged in
the confrontation with the liberal state and its policies of racial reform.
Viewed by critical race theorists as intransigent and repressive,'12 the state
offers the possibility of accommodation as a remedy for the racial inequi-
ties of the criminal-justice system. By definition, accommodation entails
compromise and cooptation. Demands must be muted. Affirmative regula-
tion must be tempered. More troublesome, the act of regulation-
administrative or legislative-may weaken the marshaling of protest, there-
fore diluting community power.
To mitigate the dissipating regulation that accompanies state accom-
modation to minority groups' egalitarian demands, critical race theory
proffers an ethic, of resistance." 3 That ethic is garnered daily from the in-
terwoven histories of the environmental-justice, labor, and neighborhood-
renewal movements."' These economic-justice movements tender no as-
surances against community-debilitating accommodation or the erection of
a disfiguring model-minority status which may be divisive in its effect on
many and unobtainable by most."5 Instead, like the feminist ethic of care,
the ethic furnishes a critical stance from which to appraise narrative decla-
rations of racial identity.
The stance of resistance deduced from critical race theory seeks out
racial bias and discrimination in the criminal-justice system in advocacy,
adjudication, and policing." 6 The main purpose here is not to institute a
policy of affirmative action in the regulation of crime or to test lay
112. See Wendy Brown-Scott, The Communitarian State: Lawlessness or Law Reform for
African-Americans?, 107 HARv. L. Rav. 1209, 1222-28 (1994).
113. See TRACI C. WEST, 'WOUNDS OF THE SPIRIT: BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND RESISTANCE
ETHICS 151-207 (1999).
114. See Sheila Foster, Justice From the Ground Up: Distributive Inequalities, Grassroots
Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CALIF. L. REv.
775, 788-811 (1998) (discussing the ethic in relation to the history of environmental justice); Ankur J.
Goel et al., Black Neighborhoods Becoming Black Cities: Group Empowerment, Local Control and the
Implications of Being Darker than Brown, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 415, 425-56 (1988) (citing the
ethic in relation to neighborhood incorporation); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Institutionalizing Economic
Justice: A LatCrit Perspective on the Imperatives of Linking the Reconstruction of "'Community" to
the Transformation of Legal Structures that Institutionalize the Depoliticization and Fragmentation of
Labor/Community Solidarity, 2 U. PA. J. LAB & Emp. L. 773, 797-804 (2000) (noting the ethic in
relation to the history of labor).
115. See generally Chris K. lijima, Political Accommodation and the Ideology of the "Model
Minority": Building a Bridge to White Minority Rule in the 21st Century, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1,
26-40 (1998).
116. See Kathleen Daly, Criminal Laiv and Justice System Practices as Racist, White, and
Racialized, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 431, 442-63 (1994); Joseph F. Sheley, Structural Influences on
the Problem of Race, Crime, and Criminal Justice Discrimination, 67 TUL. L. REv. 2273, 2276-90
(1993); Christopher Stone, Race, Crime, and the Administration of Justice, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Apr.
1999, at 26,27-30; Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Race, Class, and Perceptions of Discrimination
by the Police, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 494, 502-04 (1999).
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perceptions of crime, though some may pursue those objectives, but rather
to find a nexus between crime and color."7 That nexus may be unveiled in
the courtroom, in jury deliberation, in the character of the defendant, or
elsewhere in the myriad recesses of the criminal-justice system." 8 It may
manufacture disparate outcomes observed in the contexts of gender, juve-
niles, and sexuality." 9 It moreover may produce discriminatory policies of
underenforcement, for example in the prosecution of civil-rights crimes,20
and overinclusion, in the case of racial profiling.'2 ' Most startling, the race-
crime nexus may generate identity distortions, not out of "color blindness,"
but out of archaic stereotype. 122 It is these distortions that command the
attention of critical race theory and that warrant consternation over the
fate of communities of color. The next section considers the impact of
community-policing programs and drug courts on the identity of
117. See KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK
PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGGRESIONS 1-46 (1998); Andrew E.
Taslitz, An African-American Sense of Fact: The O.J. Trial and Black Judges on Justice, 7 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 219, 223-46 (1998); Carolyn Wolpert, Note, Considering Race and Crime: Distilling Non-
Partisan Policy from Opposing Theories, 36 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 265, 268-89 (1999).
118. See ARIELA J. GROSS, DOUBLE CHARACTER: SLAVERY AND MASTERY IN THE ANTEBELLUM
SOUTHERN COURTROOM 72-121 (2000); John M. Conley et al., The Racial Ecology of the
Courtroom: An Experimental Study of Juror Response to the Race of Criminal Defendants, 2000 WIs.
L. REV. 1185, 1187-95; Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the
Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 123-56, 180-81 (1998); Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of
the Nullijying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 877, 887-947 (1999); Nancy S. Marder, The Interplay of Race
and False Claims of Jury Nullification, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 285, 301-14 (1998); Samuel R.
Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions of Guilt and Dispositional
Attributions, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1367, 1376-78 (2000).
119. See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court-Part II. Race and the "Crack
Down" on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 340-81 (1999); Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence,
Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777, 788-806 (2000); W. John Thomas et al., Race,
Juvenile Justice, and Mental Health: New Dimensions in Measuring Pervasive Bias, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 615, 662-69 (1999); Adrien K. Wing & Christine A. Willis, From Theory to
Praxis: Black Women, Gangs, and Critical Race Feminism, 11 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 4-9 (1999); see also
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race
Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 10-40 (1999) (discussing multifaceted identity
and juridical outcomes in the context of sexuality); Lisa C. Ikemoto, Male Fraud, 3 J. GENDER, RACE
& JUST. 511, 513-33 (2000) (same).
120. See, e.g., David Harris, Law Enforcement's Stake in Coming to Grips with Racial Profiling, 3
RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 9, 12-19 (2001) (discussing overinclusion in racial profiling); Frederick M.
Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 TUL.
L. REV. 2113, 2200-23 (1993) (discussing underenforcement in prosecuting civil-rights crimes).
121. See Katheryn K. Russell, Racial Profiling: A Status Report of the Legal, Legislative, and
Empirical Literature, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 61, 68-80 (2001); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping
the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 983-98 (1999).
122. See Deborah L. Goldklang, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Black Rage: Clinical
Validity, Criminal Responsibility, 5 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 213, 222-29 (1997); Ariela J. Gross,
Beyond Black and White: Cultural Approaches to Race and Slavery, 101 COLUM. L. Rev. 640, 645-67
(2001); James H. McComas & Cynthia L. Strout, Combating the Effects of Racial Stereotyping in
Criminal Cases, 23 CHAMPION 22, 23 (1999); Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the
Law: How "Color Blindness" Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L.
REV. 77, 84-107 (2000).
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communities of color, noting the implications for individual and collective
empowerment.
mi
COMMUNITY ANTECEDENTS: POLICING AND DRUG COURTS
The norms and practices employed in community-policing and drug-
court programs carry substantial import for the community-prosecution
movement. Their importance steps beyond extracting alternative institu-
tional roles and relationships from the existing conventions of the criminal-
justice system to destabilizing patterns of subordination through a process
of culling and transforming entrenched roles and relationships. For com-
munities of color, the subordinating patterns of identity degradation in po-
licing and prosecution and at trial and sentencing undermine individual and
collective dignity. Further, they damage civic standing in surrounding thea-
ters of culture, politics, and society. The transformative act of interceding
and halting the repetition of these patterns slows the operation and repro-
duction of racial hierarchy. Diminishing hierarchy is crucial to realigning
the dominant and subordinate positions of not only the police, but also
prosecutors, defendants, victims, and allied groups in criminal-law advo-
cacy and adjudication. Realignment buttresses the normative underpin-
nings of the community-prosecution movement and thus reconstitutes the
process and prescriptive goals of criminal justice.
The common locus of community-policing and community drug-court
programs is the neighborhood itself. Designed to combat neighborhood
crime, disorder, and decay, the programs combine the disparate elements of
citizen organizing, economic revitalization, and community justice to forge
novel local structures of civic power in law enforcement and corrections.'
12
The purpose of these structures is to redefine citizen and state penal roles
and relationships in order to prevent or reduce crime where possible and
rehabilitate offenders where feasible.
To meet these goals, community-policing and like-minded drug-court
programs implement a citizen-participatory approach to crime reduction
and neighborhood renewal. Creatively gleaned from the normally harsh
roles and relationships of the criminal-justice system, this approach en-
dorses citizen-state collaboration, regulatory decentralization of the state
123. See WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING, CHICAGO STYLE
161-235 (1997); WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN
AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 125-58 (1990); Todd R. Clear, Toward a Corrections of "Place": The
Challenge of "Community" in Corrections, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Aug. 1996, at 52; Patrick G.
Donnelly & Charles E. Kimble, Community Organizing, Environmental Change, and Neighborhood
Crime, 43 CIME & DELINQ. 493, 502-10 (1997); Laurie Robinson, Linking Community-Based
Initiatives and Community Justice: The Office of Justice Programs, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Aug. 1996,
at 4; Deborah Lamm Weisel & Adele Harrell, Crime Prevention Through Neighborhood
Revitalization: Does Practice Reflect Theory?, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Aug. 1996, at 18.
2002]
CALIFORNIA LAWREVIEW
juridical function, and local accountability of governmental agencies to
nongovernmental organizations and citizen groups. Consonant with the
goal of prevention, the approach seeks to block crime-induced neighbor-
hood deterioration, facilitate the provision of social services, and accelerate
the revitalization of blighted neighborhoods.
Building coalitions from the bottom up, this participatory approach
renders the state more receptive to the community-specific demands of
grassroots justice campaigns in dealing with crime from arrest and indict-
ment to conviction and sentencing. Moreover, it recognizes that citizen
participation in law enforcement is the key to crime reduction, offender
rehabilitation, and victim reconciliation. Participation curbs crime by ex-
panding the normative base of law enforcement from state agents to citi-
zens. It promotes rehabilitation and reintegration by enlarging the practical
base of enforcement for the regulation of criminal offenders, especially
drug offenders.
The participatory thrust of community-policing and drug-court pro-
grams gains force from their sensitivity to neighborhood identity and their
attention to street-level empowerment. Effective community-policing
strategies conform to the local customs and spatial contours of discrete
neighborhoods. Few, if any, of such strategies will attain complete confor-
mity. What seems suitable for one neighborhood will doubtless prove un-
suitable for another. Nevertheless, fertile patterns of participation
repeatedly emerge.'24 While effective, they are prone to the disruptions of
multiracial difference, which permeate the customs of community groups.
Divided customs and contested spaces portend internal competition and
fracture the unity of community-policing programs, hampering the integra-
tive progress of community drug courts in diverse neighborhoods. Once
shattered, that unity is difficult to restore. 25
A. Community Policing
Community policing combines state intervention and grassroots citi-
zen activism. 26 Winnowed from intuition, experience, and empirical
124. For patterns of citizen participation in community-based crime-prevention strategies in New
York City, Baltimore, San Francisco, and Seattle, see GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES,
FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 157-235
(1996).
125. Distinct from its usual connotation, unity in this instance describes an arrangement less fixed
and immutable. Referring to the accord between citizen, community, and police, it is a loose, transient
unity. This impermanent and experimental quality serves the interests of community policing and
empowerment in unexpected ways. Its very transitory nature, its fluctuation from one strategic initiative
to the next, actually encourages a greater flexibility and openness to untried innovation. As a
consequence, incidents of failure or institutional breakdown deserve to be met with patience.
126. See Warren Friedman, Grassroots and Persistent: The Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood
Safety, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Aug. 1996, at 8; Tim Hope, Community Crime Prevention, 19 CRIiE &
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conjecture regarding crime, community decay, and civic disorder,127 this
burgeoning style of policing places community at the center of its strategic
calculus."2 That calculus relies on an inventive though trmcated sharing of
state power with citizen activists. 129 The sharing of state violence signals a
move toward reciprocity in police-community partnerships.
Reciprocity initially emerges from the liberal premise of mutuality in
social obligation and attends the feminist notion of caretaking. 13 Liberal
obligation, rooted in limited political engagement and bare economic ex-
change, lacks the "other"-directed empathic character of caretaking. Its
conception of dialogue relies on slender trust. Its corollary conception of
responsiveness rests on partial commitment and limited interchange.
Community caretaking puts forward a richer sense of personal bonds and
common interests within neighborhoods. Absent from the early history of
community policing, this sense of reciprocal care has achieved greater cur-
rency.
131
The feminism-derived caretaking strand of community policing pro-
vides little diversion from the profound social meaning of the order-
maintenance and zero-tolerance policies of law enforcement.3 2 Rhetorical
JUST. 21, 25-41 (1995); Wesley G. Skogan, The Community's Role in Community Policing, NAT'L
INsT. JuST. J., Aug. 1996, at 31.
127. The causal interweaving of crime, community decay, and civic disorder animates the "broken
windows" thesis of community policing. The thesis posits that street-level crime prevention and law-
enforcement strategies implemented by police in cooperation with community-based organizations may
deter crime, curb decay, and avert disorder in targeted urban neighborhoods. That thesis is roiled by
continuing theoretical and empirical debate. See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF
ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 1-121 (2001); GEORGE L. KELLING &
CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR
COMIUNITIES 11-107, 157-93, 236-57 (1996); RALPH B. TAYLOR, BREAKING AWAY FROM BROKEN
WINDOWS: BALTIMORE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE NATIONWIDE FIGHT AGAINST CRIME, GRIME,
FEAR, AND DECLINE 93-239 (2001); Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the
Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance
Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REv. 291 (1998); George L. Kelling, "Broken Windows" and
Police Discretion, NAT'L INST. JUST. RES. REP., Oct. 1999, at 1 25-47; James Q. Wilson & George L.
Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1982, at 29-38.
128. See Daniel W. Flynn, Defining the "Community" in Community Policing, in COMIUNITY
POLICING: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 491-504 (Geoffrey P. Alpert & Alex R. Piquero eds., 2d ed.
2000); Warren Friedman, The Community Role in Community Policing, in THE CHALLENGE OF
COMMUNITY POLICING: TESTING THE PROMISES 263-69 (Dennis P. Rosenbaum ed., 1994); Philip B.
Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407,421-40 (2000).
129. See WILLIAM LYONS, THE POLITICS OF COMMUNITY POLICING: REARRANGING THE POWER
TO PUNISH 135-62 (1999).
130. See Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U.
Cm. LEGAL F. 261 (1998).
131. See SUSAN L. MILLER, GENDER AND COMMUNITY POLICING: WALKING THE TALK 65-98,
139-64 (1999); Community Policing in the 1990's, NAT'L INST. JUST., Aug. 1992, at 2; Innovative
Neighborhood-Oriented Policing, NAT'L INST. JUST., Aug. 1992, at 19.
132. See Judith A. Greene, Zero Tolerance: A Case Study of Police Policies and Practices in New
York City, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 175-85 (1999) (describing zero-tolerance campaign by New York
City police as "heavily reliant on traditional methods of law enforcement to eradicate quality-of-life
problems"); Dorothy E. Roberts, Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance
2002] 1493
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
uplift and quality-of-life improvement notwithstanding,'33 community po-
licing concretely involves police-community and police-corrections part-
nerships saturated by and susceptible to racialized styles of enforcement. 134
These styles sully the state construction of identity and community.'35
The continuation of prejudicial styles of policing obliterates feminist
norms of trust and reciprocity. Furthermore, this perpetuation of prejudice
deeply wounds liberal norms of autonomy and duty while hindering the
realization of autonomy in politics and economics. Prejudice also upends
the basis for mutual obligation in society. Unabated, prejudice will impose
additional and foreseeable obstacles to community activism and mobiliza-
tion, hindering the outreach efforts necessary for the success of citizen-
police partnerships and, by extension, community-prosecution programs. 36
The decline and likely collapse of collectively negotiated outreach and
consensual partnership imperils community policing. 37 Curiously, com-
munity drug courts may escape this peril.
B. Community Drug Courts
Hailed and vilified for its foray into experimentalist government, 138
the community-drug-court movement alters the norms and practices of the
Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 799-818 (1999) (pointing out that order-maintenance
policing stigmatizes people of color and reinforces preexisting stereotypes of race-based criminality,
disorder, and lawlessness); see also Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken
Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 496 (2000) ("In
New York, the application of Broken Windows theories through [order-maintenance policing]
strategies and stop and frisk tactics produced a style of racial policing with stigmatizing effects on
minority communities.").
133. See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 551 (1997); Janet Reno, Address at the New
England School of Law Barrister's Ball (May 20, 1996), in 31 NEW ENG. L. REv. 159,
165 (1996); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S LAW ENFORCEMENT
STRATEGY: COMBATING CRIME WITH COMMUNITY POLICING AND COMMUNITY PROSECUTION-
TAKING BACK OUR NEIGHBORHOODS ONE BLOCK AT A TIME (March 1999), at http//www.usdoj.gov/
dag/pubdoc/crimestrategy.htm.
134. See Fagan & Davies, supra note 132, at 496-503; Ronald Weitzer, Racialized
Policing: Residents'Perceptions in Three Neighborhoods, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 129, 150-52 (2000).
135. See Trish Oberweis & Michael Musheno, Policing Identities: Cop Decision Making and the
Constitution of Citizens, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 897, 899-906 (1999); Margaret Raymond, Down on
the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating
Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 101-24 (1999).
136. See Michael E. Buerger, A Tale of Two Targets: Limitations of Community Anticrime
Actions, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 411, 428-30 (1994); Randolph M. Grinc, "Angels in Marble": Problems
in Stimulating Community Involvement in Community Policing, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 437, 449-50
(1994).
137. See Reenah L. Kim, Legitimizing Community Consent to Local Policing: The Need for
Democratically Negotiated Community Representation on Civilian Advisory Councils, 36 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 461,482-96 (2001).
138. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1460-64, 1473-79
(2000) (criticizing drug courts); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and
Emergency Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 841-65 (2000) (lauding drug courts);
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criminal-justice system. Alteration occurs at both jurisprudential and insti-
tutional levels. Institutionally, the movement lessens the adversarial for-
malism of prosecution and sentencing. Jurisprudentially, the movement
inserts the value of compassion into criminal justice."' Dimly instilled
within the liberal notions of autonomy and obligation, compassion be-
comes vivid in the feminist ideals of trust and reciprocity. But compassion
is not a corrective. In spite of its feminist gloss, compassion neither de-
poses nor supplants punishment. Under the aegis of community drug
courts, however, compassion and punishment reunite, recasting justice into
a community mandate 4° with both distributive and restorative com-
mands.1
4 1
Distributive commands go to the crux of neighborhood justice.4 ' In
the street-level drug economy, distributive considerations of fairness in
criminal-law enforcement, in terms of both priority and proportionality,
apply to community residents, drug offenders, and quality-of-life offenders
as well. 43 But compassion-driven distributive fairness ponders more than
even-handed justice. It undertakes an assessment closely tailored to the
plight of the offender, his place in the community, and the risk of criminal
recurrence.
Restorative commands speak plainly to the therapeutic prospects of
rehabilitative punishment.'" The visible institutional stability of commu-
nity drug courts, and their attendant procedural regularity and substantive
predictability, improves the therapeutic prospects of drug offenders,
John Feinblatt et al., Institutionalizing Innovation: The New York Drug Court Story, 28 FORDHAM URB.
LJ. 277, 282-92 (2000) (same); David B. Rottman, Community Courts: Prospects and Limits, NAT'L
INST. JUST. J., Aug. 1996, at 46 (same).
139. See John J. Ammann, Addressing Quality of Life Crimes in Our Cities: Criminalization,
Community Courts and Community Compassion, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 811, 815-19 (2000).
140. See IAN BROWNLEE, COMMUNITY PUNISHMENT: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 33-61, 161-85
(1998); Christopher Stone, Community Defense and the Challenge of Community Justice, NAT'L INST.
JUST. J., Aug. 1996, at 41; Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public
Defender About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 43-54 (2000-
2001).
141. See John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, 25
CrME & JUST. 1, 4-9 (1999); Frederick W. Gay, Restorative Justice and the Prosecutor, 27 FORDHAM
URB. LJ. 1651, 1656-62 (2000).
142. See Sally Engle Merry, Defining "Success" in the Neighborhood Justice Movement, in
NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: ASSESSMENT OF AN EMERGING IDEA 172-92 (Roman Tomasic & Malcolm
M. Feeley eds., 1982) (evaluating the quality of justice and perception of fairness in Neighborhood
Justice Centers).
143. See Kay Levine & Virginia Mellema, Strategizing the Street: How Law Matters in the Lives
of Women in the Street-Level Drug Economy, 26 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 169, 181-85 (2001); Tracey L.
Meares, Social Organization and Drug Lav Enforcement, 35 Ai. CRIm. L. REv. 191,217-26 (1998).
144. See Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in
America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 439,442-50 (1999); Pamela L. Simmons, Solving the Nation's Drug




thereby fulfilling their reintegrative state function. Efforts by community-
prosecution programs to safeguard that judicial function better serve the
redemptive and rehabilitative interests of justice than more punitive sen-
tencing approaches. Confined to drug offenders or expanded to family in-
terventions, the community-court movement entertains alternative justice
and punishment rationales that challenge prosecutors to reevaluate the
meaning of citizenship, law, and state authority. 145 The same evaluation
demands calculation of the costs and benefits of court decentralization for
prosecutors, the state, and citizen victims and offenders. The calculation
does little to establish or measure community courts' local accountability.
At a basic level, accountability is tied to juridical responsiveness and
standing. As with the community-prosecution movement, the civic stand-
ing of community courts rests on crime prevention, neighborhood revitali-
zation, and public justice. Approbation alone, and the standing it bestows,
may not save community prosecutors from grave objections.
IV
OBJECTIONS TO COMMUNITY PROSECUTION
Community-prosecution norms and practices face a gauntlet of objec-
tions. In this Part, the Essay will concentrate on three cardinal objections.
The first strikes at the movement from the standpoint of ethics. The second
seizes on the limits of institutional function. The third points out the con-
straints of political legitimacy.
A. Ethics
The objection to the community-prosecution movement from the
stance of ethics expands the ordinary mapping of the field of professional
responsibility. Typically sorted, prosecutorial responsibilities are distrib-
uted among the core subjects of discretion and a variety of peripheral top-
ics, such as pretrial publicity or privilege. 46 These responsibilities rarely
extend to choices among trial narratives, roles, or arguments touching upon
collective identity. 47 Given the racial permeation of crime and law
145. See Deborah J. Chase et al., Courts Responding to Communities: Community Courts and
Family Lar, 2 J. CENTER CHILD. & CTS. 37, 45-50 (2000); John S. Goldkamp, The Dntg Court
Response: Issues and Implications for Justice Change, 63 ALB. L. REV. 923, 950-60 (2000).
Reevaluation entails consideration of the feasibility and legitimacy of meaningful offender participation
in the alternative, rehabilitative sentencing regimes instituted by community courts.
146. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Who "'Owns" the Government's Attorney-Client Privilege?, 83
MINN. L. REV. 473 (1998); H. Morley Swingle, Prosecutors Beware: Pretrial Publicity May Be
Hazardous to Your Career, PROSECUTOR, Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 29, 32.
147. See Seyla Benhabib, Sexual Difference and Collective Identities: The New Global
Constellation, 24 SIGNS 335, 350-51 (1999); Martha Merrill Umphrey, The Dialogics of Legal
Meaning: Spectacular Trials, the Unwritten Law, and Narratives of Criminal Responsibility, 33 LAW
& Soc'v REv. 393, 402-05, 417-20 (1999); David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition,
and Professional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502, 1509-50 (1998).
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enforcement, and the suffusion of racial bias in criminal justice, ignorance
of ethical responsibilities increasingly seems contrived.
In fairness, earlier silence toward race in criminal-justice advocacy
may be attributed to a stubborn preoccupation with the defender function.
Pitched battles have been fought over the validity of that function and the
defensibility of the adversary system. 141 Those battles left the matters of
identity, narrative, and community largely unaddressed in the prosecutorial
context. Their introduction and reevaluation in the recent literature of iden-
tity and subordination in the criminal-justice process may stem from the
surfeit of high-profile race cases in the media and the ready availability of
courts transcripts and records.1 49 Whatever the exact cause, the discourse
and imagery of race in criminal trials have attained wider circulation in
academic and popular discussions of "the good lawyer" in American law
and society. These discussions now veer more quickly into the morality of
role and race-conscious responsibility.15
The reopening of race in parsing the duties of criminal prosecution
fails to supply a cogent jurisprudential rationale or a practical scheme of
implementation for a race-conscious, community-regarding ethic of crimi-
nal prosecution. The task of constructing a race-conscious community ethic
of prosecution significantly reconnects ethics to narrative and, by exten-
sion, morality. 5 That linkage attaches a narrative ethic to professional
roles and moral responsibility. This kind of narrative ethic urges collabora-
tion and the creation of a transgressive legal practice within the interpretive
community of criminal justice. 2 Transgressive practice borrows from the
classical liberal norms of autonomy, duty, and deliberation that undergird
the criminal-justice system. To raise the stake in community, the practice
burnishes those norms with the feminist ideals of agency, trust, and recip-
rocity. This intermixing manufactures a method for advancing the values of
identity, empowerment, and community in advocacy.
Practiced in communities of color, the prosecutorial ethic of narrative
integrity in telling stories of racial violence deserves application independ-
ent of Black/White identity constructs. Surrendering to a Black/White
148. See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1729, 1730-52
(1993); William H. Simon, TheEthics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1703, 1707-22 (1993).
149. Recent race cases are predominantly criminal. See Peter Margulies, Identity on
Trial: Subordination, Social Science Evidence, and Criminal Defense, 51 RUTGERS L. REv. 45, 52-73,
113-38 (1998).
150. See ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUm, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN
PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE 61-75, 207-39 (1999); V. Bradley WVendel, Professional Roles and
MoralAgency, 89 Gao. L.J. 667, 671-90 (2001) (book review).
151. See Binny Miller, Telling Stories About Cases and Clients: The Ethics of Narrative, 14 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 31-52 (2000).
152. See Andrew Goldsmith, Is There Any Backbone in This Fish? Interpretive Communities,
Social Criticism, and Transgressive Legal Practice, 23 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 373, 401-13 (1998).
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narrative dichotomy will only reproduce stereotypes.'53 The ethic also de-
mands that serious notice be paid to empowerment, embraced as much for
its transformative potential as its liberating ambiguity. 54 Admittedly, under
liberal, feminist, or critical-race canons, neither the yearning of potential
nor a single transformative event secures a racially constructive outcome.
Contemporary examples of racially reconstructive outcomes include the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Japanese
American reparation movement. 15  Nor does the freedom implied by ambi-
guity pledge reconstructive results. At the same time, nothing in this em-
brace contemplates more than a halting movement toward community
racial reconciliation. That seems like a small adjustment in a juridical proc-
ess left otherwise intact.
The ethic of race-conscious, community-regarding prosecution and its
corollary principle of narrative integrity strains conventional regulation
under the American Bar Association's Model Rules and Model Code.
156
Yet prosecutors often operate outside of the purview of regulation. Fur-
thermore, they easily navigate free of the strictures of code-defined respon-
sibilities.'57 Like civil advocates and criminal defenders, prosecutors
venture out with moral, prudential, and problem-solving resources at hand
and, equally noteworthy, a vision of the common good.'58 Even so, they
may founder on the limits of institutional function.
B. Institutional Function
The objection from institutional function to tying the ethic of race-
conscious advocacy to the community-prosecution movement arises
153. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Black and White, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1647, 1676-85 (1997) (book
review).
154. See Brook K. Baker, Traditional Issues of Professional Responsibility and a Transformative
Ethic of Client Empowerment for Legal Discourse, 34 NEw ENG. L. REV. 809, 810, 858-903 (2000)
(arguing that legal writing should expand to address "tranformative issues of outsider representation,
client empowerment and social justice"); Julie A. White & John Gilliom, Up from the Streets: Handler
and the Ambiguities of Empowerment and Dependency, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 203, 215-21 (1998).
155. See ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-
CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 151-275 (1999).
156. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2001) (enumerating affirmative and
declination duties); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103 (1969) (citing duties in
charging and timely disclosure); cf STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-1.3-3-6.2 (1993) (amplifying
regulatory force and specificity ofprosecutorial duties).
157. See Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of
Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 557-67 (1999).
158. See, e.g., Cait Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders in the Community: Expanding the
Conceptual and Institutional Boundaries of Providing Counsel to the Poor, 14 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS
401, 409-18 (2001); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The Criminal Defense Attorney: Roadblock or Bridge to
Restorative Justice, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 211, 223-26 (1999-2000); Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent
Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 287-306 (2001); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Effective




initially out of organizational theory and the sociology of bureaucracy. 15 9
Put crudely, it is difficult to realign the practical facts of ensconced norms
and institutions, particularly when bound up in the arms of the state and its
pronouncements of law and order. 6 ' Considerations of competence bolster
this objection. Organizational competence and efficiency may very well
decrease in the realignment of the prosecution function. Resources may be
diverted and reallocated. New investigative, charging, and trial procedures
may be formulated. Novel labor-intensive alliances and collaborations may
be pursued. To be sure, resource redistribution and procedural revision are
not tantamount to the abdication of function. Nonetheless, concession
should be made for practicability.
But the complaint of practicability involves a deeper concern relating
to systemic function and futility. Some may properly object that the crimi-
nal-justice system is ill-equipped to prevent racial violence or violence of
any kind. 6' More profoundly, they may object that the prophylactic and
conciliatory programs instigated by community prosecution will be over-
whelmed and undone by the ineluctable bond between law and violence.
Even this overarching logic, however, does not dictate relegation of the
prosecution function solely to deterrent and retributive purposes. Addi-
tional public purposes may be taken from restorative-justice experiments in
community mediation and alternative sanctions, such as shaming.62 Alter-
native sanctions espouse both forgiveness and transformation.'63
159. On prosecutorial practice communities, see RoY B. FLEMMING ET AL., THE CRAFT OF
JUSTICE: POLITICS AND WORK IN CRIMINAL COURT COMMUNITIES 23-76 (1992); PETER F. NARDULLI,
ET AL., THE TENOR OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE GUILTY PLEA PROCESS 85-197 (1988).
160. See D. Neil MacCormick, Norms, Institutions, and Institutional Facts, 17 LAW & PHIL. 301,
324-31 (1998) (pointing out that "acts and events in the framework of normative order" present
discoverable "judgments of fact-of institutional fact-that are true so long as we assume the validity
of appropriate norms within some normative order").
161. See generally Martha Minow, Between Intimates and Between Nations: Can Law Stop the
Violence?, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 851, 859-60 (2000).
162. See Gordon Bazemore & Curt Taylor Griffiths, Conferences, Circles, Boards, and
Mediations: The "New Wave" of Community Justice Decisionmaking, 61 FED. PROBATION 25, 33-35
(1997); Robert A. Baruch Bush, The Unexplored Possibilities of Community Mediation: A Comment
on Merry and Miner, 21 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 715, 731-36 (1996); Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming
Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CH. L. REV. 733, 743-62 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative
Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591, 605-30 (1996).
163. See MARTHA MINOw, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 9-24 (1988); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS
AND MERCY 14-34, 162-86 (1988); B. Douglas Robbins, Comment, Resurrection from a Death
Sentence: Why Capital Sentences Should Be Commuted upon the Occasion of an Authentic Ethical
Transformation, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1115, 1151-68 (2001); Jill Stauffer, Seeking the Between of
Vengeance and Forgiveness: Martha Minow, Hannah Arendt, and the Possibilities of Forgiveness 1, 17
(May 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the California Law Review) (arguing that Minow's
account of forgiveness "lacks the futural orientation that allows Arendt to figure forgiveness as a
remembrance that allows humans to learn from the past without being trapped in its repetition").
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Unfortunately, in the crucible of violence, the most creative sanctions may
fail to heighten civic participation, heal pain, or cure looming threats."
Practicable race-conscious community-prosecution models tailored to
incite citizen participation in neighborhood revitalization and criminal-
justice initiatives may very well curtail state control and regulation of
crime.1 65 They may also ignite novel civil-rights claims and embolden state
remedial action by courts and governmental institutions. 166 Although com-
mentators acknowledge that a community prosecutor or a neighborhood
district attorney "doesn't have more authority than one who operates out of
a main office," they point out that "what he may have, based on his
neighborhood connections, is certain knowledge that the offender is a
problematic drug dealer and long-term nuisance to the community.
167
Hence, they stress, "[h]e can press the court to be tougher by explaining
some of the history he knows. He can offer advice on when to throw the
book at a suspect-and when to hold back.'16 Additionally, commentators
observe, "[t]he neighborhood district attorney has access to government
agencies and higher-level officials who may be the only ones with real
standing to solve a problem."' 169 The unresolved question is whether press-
ing these and other race-encumbered initiatives causes the community
prosecutor to forgo his political legitimacy and thus forfeit his state author-
ity. That is the essence of the last objection to community prosecution.
C. Political Legitimacy
The objection from political legitimacy to race-conscious community
prosecution springs from public mistrust of law, diversity-based justice
initiatives, and restorative-justice models. 7 ° The political legitimacy of the
prosecution function is bound to the expressive purposes of even-handed
law enforcement and fairly-warranted punishment.'7 ' Ordinarily,
164. See Linda Mulcahy, The Devil and the Deep Blue Sea? A Critique of the Ability of
Community Mediation to Suppress and Facilitate Participation in Civil Life, 27 J.L. & Soc'Y 133, 148-
50(2000).
165. See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 27-5 1, 167-205 (2001).
166. See Terence Dunworth & Gregory Mills, National Evaluation of Weed and Seed, NAT'L INsT.
JUST. RES. BRIEF, June 1999, 1, 7-8; Francesca Polletta, The Structural Context of Novel Rights
Claims: Southern Civil Rights Organizing, 1961-1966, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 367, 383-402 (2000);
Elizabeth Lee Thompson, Reconstructing the Practice: The Effects of Expanded Federal Judicial
Power in Postbellum Lawyers, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 306, 330 (1999).
167. See Freyman, supra note 32, at 28.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See David Owen, Cultural Diversity and the Conversation of Justice: Reading Cavell on
Political Voice and the Expression of Consent, 27 POL. THEORY 579, 591-94 (1999); Tom R. Tyler,
Public Mistrust ofthe Law: A Political Perspective, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 847, 866-72 (1998).
171. See Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories ofLaw: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 1363, 1376-1461 (2000); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of
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prosecutorial legitimacy is not linked to the encouragement of democratic
deliberation or the arbitration of disagreement. 72 Matters of political delib-
eration and disagreement usually are left to civic engagement instead of
state criminal supervision. But crime and democracy are closely inter-
twined." Crime stunts participation in civic life by suppressing individual
action and oppressing community activity. Intermixed with race and pov-
erty, crime animates racial-identity coloring, thereby hindering opportuni-
ties for democratic inclusion. Unvarnished discrimination accomplishes the
same result.
Despite their deleterious effect on racial community, crime and crimi-
nal prosecutions seem distinguishable from political violence. 74 For pur-
poses of democratic engagement and civic renewal, their brand of state
violence is more akin to the interpretive silencing of advocacy" and its
diffusion of autonomy.'76 Community prosecution makes no promise to
alleviate the silencing of participants in the criminal-justice system.'77 Fur-
ther, it makes only awkward contributions to traditional rights advocacy
and grants dubious benevolence to local community,'7 8 thus imperiling its
own alternate claim to political legitimacy.
The enumerated objections to the community-prosecution movement
from the stance of ethics, institutional function, and political legitimacy in
no way exhaust the range of available protest. Even approving critics like
Thompson assail the vague objectives and untested techniques of the
Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. Rav. 1503, 1506-14, 1531-64 (2000); Daniel McDermott,
The Permissibility of Punishment, 20 LAW & PHIL. 403, 407-13 (2001).
172. See Robert E. Goodin, Democratic Deliberation Within, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 81 (comparing
external-collective and internal-reflective deliberation) (2000); Lynn M. Sanders, Against Deliberation,
25 POL. THEORY 347 (1997).
173. See Jonathan Simon, Megan's Lmv: Crime and Democracy in Late Modern America, 25
LAv & Soc. INQUIRY 1111, 1115-34 (2000).
174. See Susan Bibler Coutin, The Oppressed, the Suspect, and the Citizen: Subjectivity in
Competing Accounts of Political Violence, 26 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 63, 67-74 (2001).
175. See generally Margaret E. Montoya, Silence and Silencing: Their Centripetal and
Centrifugal Forces in Legal Communication, Pedagogy and Discourse, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 263,
288-95, 307-20 (2000); Camille A. Gear, Note, The Ideology of Domination: Barriers to Client
Autonomy in Legal Ethics Scholarship, 107 YALE L.J. 2473, 2477-87,2495-2500 (1998).
176. On the scope and justification of autonomy-limiting rules, see Fred C. Zacharias, Limits on
Client Autonomy in Legal Ethics Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REv. 199,203-29 (2001).
177. See Forst, supra note 37, at 141 ("Community prosecution programs aim principally to
connect the prosecutor more closely to the community, not primarily to restore the victim. These
programs leave intact the fundamental principle that the prosecutor represents the state, not the victim,
in all criminal matters.").
178. Id. at 139-40. Forst complains that prosecutors
are spending scarce resources on a loosely defined set of interventions having to do with
"community outreach" and "cooperation" without the benefit of empirical evidence
validating that some are really more effective than others, or indeed that any of those usually
associated with community prosecution are useful for achieving the goals of prosecution.
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movement's pioneer programs. 7 9 Vagueness, he remarks, is compounded
by the absence of any systematic empirical study of program efficacy.
Doubtless, revisions in program infrastructure and prosecutor role invite
criticism. In assaying program infrastructure, for example, Thompson
charts discontinuities in office design and management as well as in hiring,
promotion, and training. 8° Simuilarly, in scrutinizing role performance, he
traces growing fissures in professional role differentiation generated by the
shift from a nonpartisan, adversarial crime-fighting mission emphasizing
solitary zealous advocacy to a partisan, problem-solving crime-prevention
strategy stressing the mutuality of learning in neighborhood partnership.,"
In addition to this internal critique, the community-prosecution move-
ment suffers external rebuke insofar as it allies with the restorative-justice
movement. By force of implication, the rebuke condemns community
prosecutors' recommended reliance on a restorative theory of justice and
its feminist jurisprudential acclaim. Integral to citizenship norms and
collaborative prescriptions, that reliance presumes the disavowal of retribu-
tive-justice principles and the presence of applicable indigenous commu-
nity-justice practices.
For recent critics of restorative justice, such as Kathleen Daly, reli-
ance of this sort is misplaced.' To Daly, counterposing restorative and
retributive principles in oppositional tension is schematic and false. Fur-
ther, urging the discovery and mechanical adoption of informal justice
practices in communities of color overstates the plausible construction of
restorative practices and overrides cultural differences and diversity spe-
cific to discrete communities. Instilling a feminist ethic of care in the con-
tent of restorative justice in order to salvage its appeal, Daly points out,
merely reproduces dichotomous readings of, and essentialist reasoning in,
law and justice. Therefore, Daly adds, to suggest that restorative-justice
practices create transformative relationships in the aggregate sense of
community mobilization or grassroots politics is at best hyperbole and at
worst myth.'83 Having shaken the foundation of community prosecution,
this Essay turns to its application in the setting of racial violence.
V
COMMUNITY PROSECUTION AND RACIAL VIOLENCE
Lauded for its institutional ambition and its systemic promise of
criminal justice, the community-prosecution movement presents an af-
firmative instrument to combat racial violence. To the extent that the
179. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 350-60.
180. Id. at 367-71.
181. Id. at 360-67.
182. See Kathleen Daly, Restorative Justice: The Real Story, 4 PUNISHMENT & Soc'y 55 (2002).
183. Id. at 58-67,71-73.
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movement engenders citizen participation, institutional decentralization,
and local accountability in federal and state prosecution, it offers to kindle
citizen-state modes of collaboration and ignite grassroots justice initiatives.
Both the community-policing and community-court movements represent
positive modes of citizen-state collaboration in the criminal-justice system.
The restorative-justice movement and the community-lawyering tradition
demonstrate that citizens, their legal agents, and state institutions can par-
ticipate in that collaborative process with beneficial results. In theory,
community-based collaboration by prosecutors, victims, offenders, and
neighborhood groups around criminal-justice initiatives may help alleviate
the conditions of poverty and repair the structures of political empower-
ment in communities of color.
Racial violence creates formidable barriers for the community-
prosecution movement. Steeply erected, the barriers comprise countless
types of aggression, forms of violence, and categories of victims. Instead of
endeavoring to hurdle these barriers in a sweeping catalogue of violence,
prudence recommends narrowing the instant inquiry. A helpful means of
doing so without shuttering the matter too tightly is to contract the defini-
tional parameters of racial violence.
Consider racial aggression first. Critical race theory delineates two
kinds of aggression: micro and macro. Racial aggression differs from ra-
cial violence in its sparing use of material force and physicality. Exerted by
individuals and at times groups, microaggression aims chiefly at the indi-
vidual person of color: his or her state of mind, language, and daily act of
being in the world. Macroaggression, in contrast, points to the collective
community of color. Enacted by groups, often in concert with the state, or
by the state itself, macroaggression unleashes cultural, economic, and po-
litical forces of harm. Those forces may cause cultural degradation, eco-
nomic hardship, or political disenfranchisement.
Consider racial violence next. Critical race theory, in conjunction with
the law-and-narrative movement, 84 discerns two analytic forms of vio-
lence: interpretive and physical. Interpretive violence connotes the vio-
lence of the word marked by the disfigurements of symbolic, oral, written,
and performative texts. 85 Hate speech is a brazen kind of interpretive vio-
lence. "Race-ed" speech, enunciated by prosecutors and defenders in
184. See Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs: Two Narrative Problems at the Criminal Trial, in
LAW's STORIEs: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 135-61 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds.,
1996); Charles Ogletree, Public Defender, Public Friend: Searching for the "Best Interests" of
Juvenile Offenders, in LAW STORIES 131-48 (Gary Bellow & Martha Minow eds., 1996); Abbe Smith,
On Representing a Victim of Crime, in LAW SToRIEs, supra, at 149-67; Robert Weisberg, Proclaiming
Trials as Narratives: Premises and Pretenses, in LAw's STORIEs: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE
LAW, supra, at 61-83.
185. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Lmv Practice: Learning Lessons of Client
Narrative, 100 YALE LJ. 2107, 2125-30 (1991) (discussing the way interpretive violence is fueled by
the lawyering practices of marginalization, subordination, and discipline).
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closing arguments or alluded to in jury selection, is less bold but no less
derogatory. Physical violence, by comparison, denotes a raw material
brutality. Hate crimes of assault or murder are blunt exemplars of blatant
racial violence.
Last, consider the racial victim. Historical difference and diversity
assemble a far-reaching variety of racial categories: Black, Asian
American, Latina/o, Native American, and more. Each category intermin-
gles to generate cross-racial and multi-ethnic permutations. Further, each
category merges with gender and sexuality. The ubiquity of this merger
and decades of intermingling prevent the easy unpacking of racial catego-
ries. Faced with a deeply striated victim identity, prosecutors are reluctant
to relinquish long-standing racialized narrative strategies in favor of un-
tested community-based advocacy practices, particularly when such prac-
tices may work to the detriment of victims. That reluctance is illustrated in
the traditional prosecution of criminal, civil-rights, and hate-crime cases. It
is a reluctance schooled in prosecutorial norms.
A. Prosecutorial Norms
The norms of criminal law and justice hold a fatal allure for prosecu-
tors. These are the vaunted norms of prosecutorial discretion, the norms of
the good prosecutor. 86 Good prosecutors are the virtuous agents of justice
and the celebrants of truth.'87 Disciples of neutrality,188 they imagine their
function in the formalist terms of striving for independence and propor-
tionality in charging, investigating, plea bargaining, and sentencing.'89 This
186. See Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary
Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511, 1515-29 (2000); Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person anda
Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355,372-96 (2001).
187. See Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framevork, 15
Am. J. C~iM. L. 197, 227-54 (1988) (discussing moral dimension of prosecutor's quasi-judicial role);
Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 316-36, 351-53
(2001) (discussing prosecutorial duties of candor and disclosure); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the
Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 103-13
(1991) (discussing prosecutorial duty to pursue justice).
188. See H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a
Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1697-1705 (2000).
189. See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of
Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 408-15 (2001); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion,
Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105, 149-157
(1994); Rory K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in Their Investigative
Role, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 723, 733-50 (1999); Shelby A. Dickerson Moore, Questioning the
Autonomy of Prosecutorial Charging Decisions: Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion-
Knowing There Will Be Consequences for Crossing the Line, 60 LA. L. REV. 371, 377-91 (2000); Frank
J. Remington, The Decision to Charge, the Decision to Convict on a Plea of Guilty, and the Impact of
Sentence Structure on Prosecution Practices, in DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE TENSION
BETWEEN INDIVIDUALIZATION AND UNIFORMITY 73-133 (Lloyd E. Ohlin & Frank J. Remington eds.,




self-serving formalism,'9" however, belies the bias immersed in criminal
law' 91 and the animus cloaked in law-enforcement discretion. 92 This mask-
ing of prejudice and overzealous excess overlooks the incidence of selec-
tive, race-based prosecution. 93 It also obscures the recurrent dilemmas of
race and occasions for conscientious noncompliance in the prosecution
process. 1
94
Current debates over prosecutorial regulation, responsibility, and
enforcement lend little to the resolution of these dilemmas. 95 Standards of
impropriety and misconduct offer meager guidance as well.'96 The limited
guidance available comes from past calls for proactive prosecution, leader-
ship in the war on drugs, and authority in juvenile-justice proceedings.
97
Those calls summon prosecutors on behalf of the victim and the accused, 198
but seldom on behalf of the community. The explanation for this muted
summons lies in the nature of racial norms.
190. For a race-neutral variant of practice formalism, see HARRY I. SUBIN ET AL., THE CRIINAL
PROCESS: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTIONS 162-386 (1993).
191. See generally Note, Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 1472, 1520-57, 1588-95 (1988) (discussing race and prosecutorial conduct in charging).
192. See David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New
Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEo. L.J. 1059, 1074-82 (1999); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and
Race: The Power andPrivilege ofDiscretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 13,20-26,31-38 (1998).
193. See Michael Tomy, Racial Politics, Racial Disparities, and the War on Crime, in POLTICS,
CRIME CONTROL, AND CULTURE 3-22 (Stuart A. Scheingold ed., 1997).
194. See Bruce A. Green, Lawyer Discipline: Conscientious Noncompliance, Conscious
Avoidance, and Prosecutorial Discretion, 66 FORDHAM L. Rev. 1307, 1310-12 (1998); Kenneth B.
Nunn, The "Darden Dilemma": Should African Americans Prosecute Crimes?, 68 FORDHAm L. REv.
1473, 1492-1509 (2000).
195. See Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too
Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMtAs L. REv. 69, 77-91 (1995); Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the
Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?, 65 FORDHAMi L. RFV. 355, 359-77, 423-27 (1996); Kevin C.
McMunigal, Are Prosecutorial Ethics Standards Different?, 68 FORDHAM L. RV. 1453, 1458-68
(2000); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. Rav. 721, 725-65
(2001); Fred C. Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors, or, Who Should
Regulate the Regulators?: Response to Little, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 429, 446-62 (1996).
196. See BENNETT L. GERSIMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 14:1-14:20 (2d ed. 1999)
(discussing standards of misconduct); JOSEPH F. LAWLESS JR., PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT: LAW,
PROCEDURE, FoInS 839-947 (2d ed. 1999); Roberta K. Flowers, What You See Is What You
Get: Applying the Appearance of Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 Mo. L. REv. 699, 704-19,
728-39 (1998).
197. See AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., BEYOND CONVICTIONS: PROSECUTORS AS
COM1IUNITY LEADERS IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 241-88 (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Assistance ed., 1993); James C. Backstrom, The Role of the Prosecutor in Juvenile Justice: Advocacy
in the Courtroom and Leadership in the Community, 50 S.C. L. REv. 699, 703-14 (1999); W. Allan
Williams, The Casefor Proactive Prosecution, 13 CRIM. JUST. J. 389, 390-94 (1992).
198. See Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of
Government, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599, 1605 (2000).
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B. Racial Norms
Race and racism seem pervasive in the criminal-justice system. 9
More pronounced than the discrimination still insidious elsewhere in the
law, racial animus and imagery seem to grip criminal law even as crime
rates decline.2"' Devastating to already-distressed communities, stereotypes
in crime prevention and criminal prosecution betray the purported neutral-
ity of legal decision makers.20' The same stereotypes apparently foreclose
expanding the institutional ranks of legal decision makers to rectify that
bias.02
The virulence and tenacity of stereotypes in the criminal-justice sys-
tem frustrate the prosecution of racial violence depicted in police brutality
cases under criminal and civil-rights statutes in federal and state courts
from New York City to Los Angeles. 23 Frustration stems from law as well
as narrative z.2 ' Both police brutality and drug trials illustrate the impact of
narrative. 25 The rhetoric of race in the thinly veiled jury narratives of such
trials evokes racial identity and race-coded relations of hierarchy in law
199. See CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION OF COLOR 115-219 (1993);
Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1660,
1674-84 (1996); Scot Wortley et al., Just Des(s)erts? The Racial Polarization of Perceptions of
Criminal Injustice, 31 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 637, 646-51, 664-70 (1997).
200. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1739, 1743-66
(1993).
201. On race infected legal decision making, see Jody Armour, Stereotypes and
Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 733, 750-66
(1995).
202. See Naftali Bendavid, Race, Hope, and Eric Holder; Some Black A USAs Say Expectations for
Advancement Have Remained Unfulfilled, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 18, 1996, at 1.
203. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, AN INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF THE Los ANGELES POLICE
DEPARTMENT'S BOARD OF INQUIRY REPORT ON THE RAMPART SCANDAL (Sept. 11, 2000) (discussing
police-brutality prosecution in Los Angeles); Susan Bandes, Patterns ofInjustice: Police Brutality in
the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1275, 1281-1309 (1999); Lou Cannon, L.A.P.D. Confidential, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Oct. 1, 2000) at 32 (discussing police-brutality prosecution in Los Angeles); Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Rampart Scandal and the Criminal Justice System in Los Angeles County, 57 GUILD
PRACTITIONER 121, 131-32 (2000) (same); John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Misconduct, 2000 Wis.
L. REV. 789, 802-11 (2000); Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State and Federal Civil Rights
Prosecutions: The Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L. REV. 509, 534-44 (1994); Gary C.
Williams, Policing the Criminal Justice System: Incubating Monsters?: Prosecutorial Responsibility
for the Rampart Scandal, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 829, 835-41 (2001); Jessica A. Rose, Note, Rebellious
or Regnant: Police Brutality Lawyering in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 619, 652-60 (2000).
204. See Richard Emery & Ilann Margalit Maazel, Why Civil Rights Lawsuits Do Not Deter Police
Misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and a Proposed Solution, 28 FORDHAM URa. L.J. 587,
588-90 (2000).
205. See Mark S. Davies, Enlisting the Jury in the "War on Drugs": A Proposed Ban on
Prosecutors' Use of "War on Drugs" Rhetoric During Opening and Closing Argument of a Narcotics
Trial, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 395, 398-412 (1994); James Joseph Duane, What Message Are Ve
Sending to Criminal Jurors When We Ask Them to "Send a Message" with Their Verdict?, 22 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 565, 589-635 (1995); Anita Kalunta-Crumpton, The Prosecution and Defence of Black
Defendants in Drug Trials, 38 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 561, 563-82 (1998); David Dante Troutt, Screws,
Koon, and Routine Aberrations: The Use of Fictional Narratives in Federal Police BrutaliO'
Prosecutions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18, 96-121 (1999).
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and society. This intractable hierarchy, and the explosive fears of its top-
pling, fuels the racial violence of hate crimes
2 1
6
The growth of hate-crime legislation and the prosecution of hate-
incited racial violence show the breadth of institutional competence and the
scope of political legitimacy enjoyed by prosecutors.207 Like community
prosecution, hate-crime prosecution endorses multiracial identity claims
and democratic equality norms.2 °S It too suffers regulatory complexities and
fallacies of race-neutrality, enduring distinctive debates over penalty en-
hancement and incommensurability.2 9 Although it continues to survive
these objections, the legislation and prosecution of hate crimes will prevail
only with federal and state remedial enforcement coupled with community
mobilization.210 Indeed, as with community prosecution, effective hate-
crimes enforcement entails citizen participation, office decentralization,
local integration, and sustained outreach. Like the prosecution of racial
violence, anti-hate initiatives spur citizen-state collaboration and mobilize
grassroots justice campaigns. In practice, however, community-based col-
laboration by prosecutors and neighborhood groups in criminal-justice
campaigns against hate and racial violence may fail. That too frequent re-
sult consigns communities of color to poverty and powerlessness, and
leaves the subject of law, crime, and community in disarray.
206. See VALERIE JENNESS & KENDAL BROAD, HATE CRIMES: NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE 21-46 (1997); JACK LEVIN & JACK MCDEVITT, HATE CRIMES: THE RISING
TIDE OF BIGOTRY AND BLOODSHED 75-114 (1993).
207. See JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW AND IDENTITY
POLITICS 29-44, 92-110 (1998); FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER
AMERICAN LAW 9-44, 110-60 (1999); Howard Cohen, The Significance and Future of Racially
Motivated Crime, 27 INT'L J. Soc. L. 103, 107-12 (1999); James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Hate
Crimes: A Critical Perspective, 22 CRIME & JUST. 1, 5-9 (1997) (discussing three categories of hate
crime laws: substantive crimes, sentence enhancements, and reporting statutes); Andrew E. Taslitz,
Condemning the Racist Personality: Why the Critics of Hate Crimes Legislation Are Wrong, 40 B.C.
L. REV. 739, 758-65 (1999).
208. See Andrew Altman, The Democratic Legitimacy of Bias Crime Laws: Public Reason and
the Political Process, 20 LAW & PHIL. 141, 162-67 (2001); Michael Blake, Geeks and Monsters: Bias
Crimes and Social Identity, 20 LAW & PHIL. 121, 123-27 (2001); Alon Harel & Gideon Parchomovsky,
On Hate and Equality, 109 YALE L.J. 507, 532-34 (1999); Tanya Kateri Hemandez, Bias
Crimes: Unconscious Racism in the Prosecution of "Racially Motivated Violence", 99 YALE L.J. 845,
847-55 (1990); Charles H. Jones, Hate Crimes and Negro Freedom, 1 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 357,
358-65 (1999); Lu-in Wang, The Complexities of "Hate", 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 808-15 (1999)
(discussing penalty-enhancement models).
209. See Claudia Card, Is Penalty Enhancement a Sound Idea?, 20 LAW & PHIL. 195, 205-11
(2001); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (invalidating New Jersey "hate crimes"
sentencing enhancement scheme under Sixth Amendment right to jury trial and Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause); Dan M. Kahan, Punishment Incommensurability, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691,
694-96 (1998).
210. See BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 23-59, 171-81 (1997); Jack Greenberg, Civil Rights Enforcement Activity of
the Department of Justice, 8 BLACK L.J. 60 (1983); Gregory L. Padgett, Racially-Motivated Violence
and Intimidation: Inadequate State Enforcement and Federal Civil Rights Remedies, 75 J. CRIm. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 103 (1984).
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CONCLUSION
The subject of law, crime, and community is now an integral part of
American civic and political culture. It connects usefully to larger studies
of race, lawyers, and ethics in the criminal-justice system. Moreover, it
focuses productively on the role of prosecutors in community-based advo-
cacy, especially in communities of color. Pinioned by poverty and crime, it
is a subject that reopens the mundane daily judgments by prosecutors about
the racial identity of defendants and victims, the racialized narrative of pre-
trial and trial texts, and the race-coded strategies and tactics of representa-
tion. In sum, it is a break point for unconventional treatments of the
prosecutorial function in the literature of criminal justice and legal eth-
ics. 211
Crucial to this ongoing search for community in criminal law is the
effort to boil down and transform the social meaning of race, community,
and criminal justice into a pedagogy of practice for prosecutors. This effort
builds from the ideology of independence and self-regulating professional
power.z12 It harnesses that ideology to recast the professional community of
prosecutors and, in so doing, reinvigorates the idea of prosecuting for so-
cial justice.213 To be of use in communities of color, this idea must endorse
a race-sensitive, community-wide conception of justice. This conception
can be rooted in an "other"-regarding, public-minded prosecutorial practice
that reconceives the prosecution function in the spirit of cause lawyering
for the common good.214 That spirit entails commitments to democratic
community and dialogue.
211. This Colloquium and its scholars likewise establish a point of departure from traditional
accounts of criminal law and the criminal-justice system. The scholars counted here search for
community in the criminal law from exploratory stances shaped by an abiding normative interest in the
private and public meaning of procedural rules, substantive laws, and social relationships. No doubt
their rendering of the community-prosecution movement and its social meaning in contemporary
criminal-law policy will swerve from mine. They will trace its history, assay its norms, and assess its
practices differently. And they will rally separate and perhaps more powerful objections. Despite their
divergent paths, the collective enterprise will continue.
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with a Progressive Bite, 62 IND. L.J. 183, 186-205 (1987); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of
Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV 1, 30-69 (1988).
213. See Kevin R. Johnson, Lawyering for Social Change: What's a Lawyer to Do?, 5 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 201, 215-27 (1999).
214. See John 0. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at
the Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927, 1932-40 (1999); Tanina
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Prosecutor-instigated interracial dialogue involves the embrace of a
community-leadership role and the reciprocal faith in community through
secular and nonsecular coalitions. This faith in civic engagement gives
force to a community ethic of prosecutorial practice. 15 Of course, commu-
nity will vary by history and place.216 Engagement will rise and fall accord-
ing to chance and contingencies in particularized cultural and social
contexts. Within these contexts "responsibility to and for others" is a dia-
logic obligation.2 7 For this reason, prosecutors must pursue a kind of co-
operative democratic experimentalism.
218
The incantation of democratic experimentalism is hardly a call for
professional abnegation or racial assimilation. Instead, it captures the hope
for a sense of belonging, not simply to a group but to a community, even a
polity.219 That aspiration establishes an ethical stance of openness in which
resistance provides a means of reconciliation.2 Openness carries a sense
of reciprocity and implies a promise of accountability found in liberal ac-
counts of deliberative democracy,221 though perhaps not solidarity. 22 The
accounts run afoul when confronted by bad faith, identity politics, and
215. See Anna Greenberg, The Church and the Revitalization of Politics and Community, 115 POL.
Sc. Q. 377, 382-86 (2000) (discussing churches' attempts to stimulate civic engagement among their
members); Symposium, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work An Interfaith Conference, 66
FORDHAM L. REv. 1075 (1998). Some postmodem scholars may envision this practice in the
Foucaultian terms of denormalizing identity. See Michael Schwartz, Repetition and Ethics in Late
Foucault, 117 TELOS 113, 114 (1999) ("Ethical practice, styled as an aesthetics of existence, may, then
be construed as a Foucaultian tactic for denormalizing identity, with the hope of leading toward a more
effective political challenge.") (footnote omitted).
216. See CAROL J. GREENHOUSE ET AL., LAW AND COMMUNITY IN THREE AMERICAN TowNs 149-
71 (1994); see also JOEL F. HANDLER, LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY 82-106 (1990)
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217. See Richard K. Shenvin, Ethical Enchantment: An Affirmative Postmodem Approach to
Law (Mar. 3, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the California Law Review) (positing an
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EVERYDAY LIFE 233-34 (1998) (noting that "resistance involves a recognition that power is not
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and Constitution Making, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 97-122 (Jon Elster ed., 1998).
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deficiencies in public reason."' These deficiencies heighten the importance
of public accountability for a discourse of community and inclusion.2 4
The moral personality of the community prosecutor carries a com-
mitment to civic and community education.225 Activating that commitment
risks the expansion of state authority and the approval of contestable moral
claims that may advance private interests at the expense of public benefits.
This risk may be the consequence of treating criminal law as a moral and
political resource.226 However, any meaning-making practice, legal or cul-
tural, may sometimes prove costly and disabling,227 especially when iden-
tity devolves into essentialism.
The proposal-to burden prosecutors with color-conscious policies
that respect community identity and narrative integrity-reaches for a
deeper account of political liberalism under democracy. 28 Broadening that
account enriches our understanding of race, its distinctive epistemology,
and its interpretation. The inclusion of race into the public dialogue and
reasoning of criminal law is an experiment that may go awry. Likewise,
community prosecution is described as "an evolving experiment in
organizational change that is proceeding step by step and neighborhood by
neighborhood in response to citizen complaints" 229 of fear and injustice that
too may fall skewed.23° Ironically, both enterprises mirror the evolving
223. See William H. Simon, Three Limitations of Deliberative Democracy: Identity Politics, Bad
Faith, and Indeterminacy, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
49, 50-54 (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999).
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230. See Forst, supra note 37, at 141. Forst notes:
As currently conceived, community prosecution programs do little either to make prosecutors
more systematically accountable to citizens for their workaday, behind-the-scene
performance in all felony cases or to promote a deep, transformational sense ofjustice. While
these programs may offer superficial political advantages for prosecutors, and may even
produce marginal gains in crime abatement, they represent no 'paradigm shift.' They may, in
fact, divert the attention of prosecutors from reforms that could really serve members of the
community most in need of relief of crime.
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tensions between modem and postmodem jurisprudential movements in
law and race.23 '
231. See Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 741, 759-66
(1994).
